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INTRODUCTION

Individuals with traumatic brain injuries ("TBI") have a greater risk
of becoming justice-involved1 due to the role that many TBIs play in
impulse control and judgment. 2 These individuals' cases are often not

handled in the way that the cases of defendants who present with mental
illness or intellectual disability may be-there may be no discussion of
diversion opportunities or a need for comprehensive evaluation and
treatment. 3 Additionally, attorneys assigned to represent this cohort may

1. This paper will focus primarily on those involved in the criminal justice system.
There are also multiple issues that are of great significance when the individual is involved
in the civil justice system, either in individual negligence actions-see generally, e.g.,
Joseph M. Desmond, Mental and Physical Examinations in Cases Involving Brain Injuries
and Psychological Injuries, 90 MASS. L. REV. 2 (2006)-or in cases involving what is
characterized as systematic negligence (most notably involving former college and National
Football League players-see generally, e.g., Elizabeth Etherton, Systematic Negligence:
The NCAA ConcussionManagement Planand Its Limitations, 21 SPORTS LAWS. J. 1 (2014));
those issues are beyond the scope of this paper.
2. For example, the estimated prevalence of TBI in the overall offender population is
60.25%, Eric J. Shiroma et al., Prevalence of Traumatic Brain Injury in an Offender
Population:A Meta-Analysis, 16 J. CORR. HEALTH CARE 147, E2 (2010), and claims of brain
injuries are "common" in criminal (as well as in civil) cases. Jane Campbell Moriarty et al.,
Brain Trauma, PET Scans and Forensic Complexity, 31 BEHAV. SCd. & L. 702, 702 (2013).
Importantly, these injuries are not always reported in medical records. See, e.g., Robert E.
Hanlon et al., NeuropsychologicalFeaturesof Indigent Murder Defendants and Death Row
Inmates in Relation to Homicidal Aspects of Their Crimes, 25 ARCHIVES CLINICAL
NEUROPSYCH. 1, 6 (2009) ("Eighty-seven percent of the sample [of murder defendants and
death row inmates] reported a history of closed head trauma; however, only 10% had a
documented history of TBI, based on medical and radiological records."). TBI is prevalent
in general. As of 2014, there were approximately 2.5 million TBI-caused emergency
department visits per year. See Jennifer R. Marin et al., Trends in Visits for Traumatic
Brain Injury to Emergency Departments in the United States, 311 JAMA 1917 (2014).
3. For information on the representation of defendants with mental disabilities, see
generally Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, "Mr. Bad Example": Why Lawyers Need to
Embrace Therapeutic Jurisprudence to Root Out Sanism in the Representationof Persons

with Mental Disabilities, 16 WYO. L. REV. 299 (2016); Michael L. Perlin & Naomi M.
Weinstein, Said I, 'But You Have No Choice': Why a Lawyer Must Ethically Honor a Client's
Decision About Mental Health Treatment Even if It Is Not What S/he Would Have Chosen,
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not have encountered individuals with TBI before and may not be
familiar with behavioral manifestations that could be relevant as a
4
defense or as mitigation in individual cases. In this regard, TBI is
5
grossly misunderstood.
A grave example of this point, and a foundation for this Article, is the
case of Lisa Montgomery, who, despite evidence of serious mental illness
and significant brain damage, was convicted, sentenced to death, and
ultimately executed for the murder of a pregnant woman and the
6
Montgomery was the first
kidnapping of the woman's unborn child.
1953, and was executed
since
U.S.
the
in
woman to face federal execution
wrong with the way we
is
that
all
reflects
case
on January 13, 2021.7 Her
15 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 73 (2016/2017); MICHAEL L. PERLIN ET AL.,
LAWYERING SKILLS IN THE REPRESENTATION OF PERSONS WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES:
CASES AND MATERIALS (2006).

4. It is significant that as many as 60% of TBI cases go undiagnosed. See Brett A.
Emison, A Silent Injury, TRIAL, Feb. 2018, at 20.
5. For example, a sample of those studied endorsed a wide range of misconceptions,
including an astonishing 42% stating that a second blow to the head would improve memory
functioning. See Thomas J. Guilmette & Michael F. Paglia, The Public's Misconceptions
About Traumatic Brain Injury: A Follow Up Survey, 19 ARCHIVES CLINICAL NEUROPSYCH.
183, 188 (2004).
6. See United States v. Montgomery, 635 F.3d 1074, 1079-80 (8th Cir. 2011).
Montgomery exhausted her direct appeals in 2012 and her collateral challenges to the
sentence in August 2020. See Montgomery v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 199 (2020).
Montgomery had been the victim of sexual violence and domestic abuse so relentless, it left
her severely mentally ill. See Lisa Montgomery, CORNELL CTR. ON THE DEATH PENALTY

WORLDWIDE, CORNELL L. SCH., https://deathpenaltyworldwide.org/advocacy/the-case-oflisa-montgomery/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2021). Department of Justice ("DOJ") officials
announced her execution date on October 16, 2020, during the middle of National Domestic
Violence Awareness Month. 'This is Not Justice'-FederalExecution Spree Ends with
Planned Execution of African-American on Martin Luther King Jr's Birthday, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Jan. 18, 2021), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/this-is-not-justicefederal-execution- spree-ends-with-planned-execution-of-african-american-on- martinluther-king-jr-s-birthday. Montgomery's case attracted international attention, with the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights having-vainly-called for a stay of her
execution. See Human Rights Tribunal Calls for Stay of Execution for Lisa Montgomery,
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Dec. 18, 2020), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/human-

rights-tribunal-calls-for-stay-of-execution-for-lisa-montgomery; see also IA CHR Adopts
PrecautionaryMeasures in Favor of Woman on Death Row in the United States of America,
OAS (Dec. 2, 2020), https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2020/288.asp
(concluding that Montgomery was "in a situation of serious and urgent risk of irreparable
harm to her rights"). A coalition of United Nations ("UN") human rights experts also issued
an unusual joint appeal calling for clemency in Mrs. Montgomery's case. See UN Experts
Call for Clemency for Lisa Montgomery After US Government Reschedules Execution,
2020),
OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM'R (Dec. 3,
UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS.
9
&LangI
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=2655
D=E.
7. Erik Ortiz & Phil Helsel, U.S. Executes Lisa Montgomery, FirstWoman Put to Death
Since 1953, NBC NEWS (Jan. 13, 2021, 2:11 AM),
in Federal System
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treat criminal defendants with traumatic brain injuries. 8 In this paper,
we discuss common ways that individuals with traumatic brain injuries
become involved in the criminal justice system, and how attorneys can
better prepare an effective defense or mitigation.9 We consider, in some
depth, several of the substantive areas of criminal law and procedure in
which an understanding of TBI is especially significant (including, but
not limited to, competency status, the insanity defense and the death
penalty), and assess the quality of counsel-and experts-in such cases,
using the Montgomery case as a prism.'1
We believe that one (at least partial) remedy for the current situation
is a turn to therapeutic jurisprudence. Therapeutic jurisprudence ("TJ")
is a field of legal scholarship that encourages its practitioners to use the
law as an agent of therapeutic benefit. TJ doctrine emphasizes giving

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/judge-halts-execution-lisa-montgomery-onlywoman-federal-death-row-n 1253658; see also Tal Axelrod, Federal Government Executed
More Prisonersin 2020 Than All States Combined:Research, THE HILL (Dec. 16, 2020, 9:54
AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/530431-federal-government-executesmore-prisoners-in-2020-than-all-states ("The [DOJ] ...
oversaw a ramp-up in federal
executions after a 17-year break, executing 10 prisoners in 2020 compared with seven by
states that still employ capital punishment, according to a new report by the Death Penalty
Information Center (DPIC).").
8. No mention was made in any court opinion of the prosecutor's misconduct, in
criticizing the defendant's decision to have her children testify during the penalty phase of
her trial; the defendant had an unquestioned Sixth Amendment right to have her children
testify at her trial. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). In the Montgomery
opinion, Judge Wollman discusses the prosecutor's comments regarding Montgomery's
decision to have her children testify:
During penalty phase closing argument, the prosecutor argued, "Deception,
manipulation is a way of life and they want you to give her credit and say she's a
good wife, a good mother. She never apologized for her actions." Defense counsel's
objection to the argument was overruled, and the prosecutor set forth the following
argument in rebuttal: "And then after all of that she drags those kids into court
here to testify in this high profile case in front of all these people and puts them
through this again and victimizes them again in front of the whole world.... She
drug [sic] these kids in here to testify on her behalf. Don't you think that's painful
for them. She's a good mom? Most of us, if we had children [and] we were involved
in a situation we would want them a thousand miles away from this. We wouldn't
make them come to court and testify."
Montgomery, 635 F.3d at 1096.
9. See infra Section II(a)(iii)(3).
10. See infra Sections II (discussing the relationship between TBI, criminal behavior,
and criminal procedure), III (discussing the role of counsel), and IV (discussing the role of
experts).
11. Michael L. Perlin, "His Brain Has Been Mismanaged with Great Skill" How Will
JurorsRespond to Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?, 42 AKRON L. REV.
885, 912 (2009); see infra Section V.
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an individual client dignity, voice, validation and voluntariness of action
and decision. 12 This is particularly important for an individual with TBI,
who will likely have the capacity to make the majority of decisions about
his case, but may still need behavioral treatment or interventions for
13
symptoms of the TBI. It is also likely that such a defendant has been
seen in the past as one who did not have the capacity for such decision
making. 14 We will discuss the ways that TJ plays into these issues, and
how the principles of dignity, voice, validation and voluntarinessbesides having to inform the law that is relevant to cases of such
individuals-are necessities for anyone who works with this population
15
(including caregivers, therapists and counsel). We conclude with some
modest suggestions as to how we can begin to make needed changes in
16
the criminal justice system to take all of these issues into account.
The paper title comes, in part, from Bob Dylan's 2006 song, When the
Deal Goes Down, which includes the following stanza:
My bewildering brain, toils in vain
Through the darkness on the pathways of life
Each invisible prayer is like a cloud in the air
Tomorrow keeps turning around
We live and we die, we know not why
But I'll be with you when the deal goes down. 17
In his masterful book, Why Bob Dylan Matters, Prof. Richard Thomas

tells us that the lyrics of this song reflect "a deep sense of humanity, and
of survival," 18 a sentiment with which we agree. When a lawyer
represents a defendant with TBI, they must exhibit this same "deep
19
sense of humanity" so as to enhance the client's chances for "survival."

12.
13.

Perlin & Lynch, supra note 3; see infra Section V(b).
See Kristen L. Triebel et al., Neurocognitive Models of Medical Decision-Making

REHAB.
Capacity in Traumatic Brain Injury Across Injury Severity, 31 J. HEAD TRAUMA

E49, E49-50 (2016); John McMillan, Acquired Brain Injury, Mental Illness, and the
Subtleties of Competence Assessment, 25 PHIL., PSYcHIATRY & PSYCH. 25, 25, 27 (2018);
Laura E. Dreer et al., Cognitive Predictors of Medical Decision-Making Capacity in
TraumaticBrain Injury, 53 REHAB. PSYCH. 486, 486-87 (2008).
14. See Triebel et al., supra note 13, at E57-58; McMillan, supra note 13, at 26; Dreer
et al., supra note 13, at 487.
15. See infra Section V(b).
16. See infra Conclusion.
17. Bob Dylan, When the Deal Goes Down, BOB DYLAN, https://www.bobdylan.com/
songs/when-deal-goes-down/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2021).
18.

RICHARD F. THOMAS, WHY BOB DYLAN MATTERS 230 (2017).

19.

Id.
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We believe that it is through the use of therapeutic jurisprudence that
this can best be done.

I. WHAT IS TBI
The term "traumatic brain injury" is not a description for a particular
type of injury; rather, it serves as a catch-all term for myriad types of
organic brain injury and damage.20 The United States Centers for
Disease Control define a TBI as "a disruption in the normal function of
the brain that can be caused by a bump, blow, or jolt to the head, or
penetrating head injury." 2 1 Traumatic brain injuries can vary widely in
their severity, and "may range from 'mild' (i.e., a brief change in mental
status or consciousness) to 'severe' (i.e., an extended period of
unconsciousness or memory loss after the injury)." 22 The effects from a
traumatic brain injury can last anywhere from a couple of days to a week,
through the rest of someone's life. 23 The effects of a traumatic brain
injury, regardless of cause or location, can range from mild to severe, and
can include [impairments related to] thinking or memory, movement,
sensation (e.g., vision or hearing), or emotional functioning (e.g.,

personality changes, depression)." 24 This type of change in emotional

regulation, in particular, will be discussed in greater detail as it relates
to the commission of criminal acts. 25 The particular type of injury, in
addition to the severity, can make a difference in the symptoms
expressed and the prognosis. Focal and penetrating injuries tend to

injure specific portions of the brain, so a person injured in these ways
may have less overall neurological damage, depending on where the
injury occurred and the cognitive processes present in the injured area. 26
Conversely, a person who suffers a coup-contrecoup injury such as a hard
impact after a fall can have injury to both the area of the brain at the

20. Jean A. Langlois et al., The Epidemiology and Impact of TraumaticBrain Injury,
21 J. HEAD TRAUMA REHAB. 375, 375 (2006).
21. Injury Prevention & Control: Traumatic Brain Injury Prevention, CTRS. FOR
DIsEASE

CONTROL

&

PREVENTION,

https://www.cdc.gov/injury/stateprograms/

topic traumatic-brain-injury.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2021).
22.

Concussion

and

Traumatic

Brain

Injury

Prevention

Program,

CT.GOv,

https://portal.ct.gov/DPH/Health-Education-Management--Surveillance/The-Office-ofInjury-Prevention/Concussion-and-Traumatic-Brain-Injury-Prevention-Program
(last
visited Nov. 19, 2021).
23. Id.
24. Id.; see also Sureyya Dikmen et al., Rates of Symptom Reporting Following
TraumaticBrain Injury, 16 J. INT'L NEUROPSYCH. SOC'Y 401, 403-05 (2010).
25. See infra Section II(a).
26. Harvey S. Levin, Neuroplasticity Following Non-Penetrating Traumatic Brain
Injury, 17 BRAIN INJ. 665, 671 (2003).
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center of the impact, and the opposite area of the brain, due to the
27
movement of the brain back and forth during the injury.
TBIs are also classified as primary and secondary, based on how close
28
in time the injury occurred to the traumatic event. Most TBIs are a mix
of primary and secondary injuries, and a more severe initial (primary)
injury increases the likelihood that secondary injuries will have more
29
Types of primary injuries include intracranial
significant effect.
hematomas (ruptured blood vessel resulting in collection of blood in brain
31
tissue), 30 hemorrhage (bleeding in the brain), skull fracture (either a
32
coup-contrecoup
linear break or a depressed crush of the skull),
33
the result
(usually
injury
axonal
diffuse
and
(bruising of brain tissue),
34
stop).
forceful
a
following
tissue
of
tearing
of twisting or
A secondary injury that follows the primary injury generally results
from metabolic and physiological changes that begin as a result of
trauma. 35 These injuries can include hypoxia, hypotension, ischemia,
36
cerebral edema, and hydrocephalus.
The injuries sustained are also generally categorized as being either
37
penetrating or closed. A penetrating TBI is one in which the outer layer
38
as the dura, is compromised. This can be caused
known
of the meninges,
39
by projectiles like bullets or knives. A well-known example of a
penetrating TBI is the case of Phineas Gage, who was injured by a
railroad spike that destroyed much of his left frontal lobe, and became a
case study in significant personality change following frontal lobe
27. Mohammadreza Ramzanpour et al., Comparative Study of Coup and Contrecoup
Brain Injury in Impact Induced TBI, 54 BIOMED. SCI. INSTRUMENTATION 76, 78-80 (2018).
28. Eko Prasetyo, The Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary Brain Injury, 23 CRITICAL
CARE & SHOCK 4, 4 (2020).
29. Id.
30. See Intracranial Hematoma, MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases3 56 14
5 (last visited Dec. 4,
conditions/intracranial-hematomasymptoms-causes/syc-20
2021).
Hemorrhage), CLEVELAND CLINIC,
31. See Brain Bleed, Hemorrhage (Intercranial
44
-brain-bleed-hemorrhage-intracranial80
https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/diseases/1
hemorrhage (last visited Dec. 4, 2021).
32. See Mary Ellen Ellis, Skull Fractures, HEALTHLINE (Mar. 8, 2019),
https://www.healthline.com/health/skull-fracture#types.
33. See Ramzanpour et al., supra note 27, at 76.
34. Prasetyo, supra note 28, at 4-5.
35. Id. at 6.
36. Id. at 5.
37.

Types of Brain Injury, STANFORD HEALTH CARE, https://stanfordhealthcare.org/

medical-conditions/brain-and-nerves/acquired-brain-injury/types.html (last visited Dec. 4,
2021).
2018),
8,
(Sept.
BRAINLINE
Traumatic Brain Injury,
of
38. Types
https://www.brainline.org/article/types -traumatic-brain-injury.
39. Id.
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injury.40 A closed TBI, on the other hand, "is [one] in which the dura
remains intact." 41 These can then be classified as mild, moderate or
severe. 42 The debate on concussion in sports, and the research around
helmet-wearing, are all related to trauma resulting in closed TBIs. 4 3
The outcome, physically and mentally, depends in large part on the
part of the brain where the injury occurred. 44 Many connections exist
between TBIs in certain areas of the brain and rapid shifts in personality,
emotional regulation, executive function, and impulse control.45 This is
where we turn next for a more in-depth look at the intersection between
TBI and criminal behavior.
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TBI, SUBSEQUENT ALLEGED CRIMINAL
BEHAVIOR, AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE QUESTIONS

A.

The Range of Criminal ProcedureTopics

We begin with the reality that research has established "that persons
accused of criminal behavior are at a very high risk of [having] traumatic
brain injuries that predate the offense with which they are charged." 46
And, "[u]nsurprisingly," claims of brain injuries are "common" in criminal
cases. 47 To exemplify this point, consider the case of Lisa Montgomery, in
40. See generally Malcolm MacMillan & Matthew L. Lena, Rehabilitating Phineas
Gage, 20 NEUROPSYCH. REHAB. 641 (2010). For a helpful discussion of the Gage case, see
Richard Redding, The Brain-DisorderedDefendant: Neuroscience and Legal Insanity in the
Twenty-First Century, 56 AM. U.L. REV. 51, 52 (2006), and see generally MALCoLM
MACMILLAN, AN ODD KIND OF FAME: STORIES OF PHINEAS GAGE (2000).
41. Types of TraumaticBrain Injury, supra note 38.
42. See id.
43. For a brief discussion about concussions in sports, see Sean D. O'Brien & Kenneth
Ferguson, TraumaticBrain Injury and the Law: Introduction, 84 UMKC L. REV. 287, 29497 (2015).
44. See, e.g., Macmillan & Lena, supra note 40, at 651-52.
45. See generally Marc C. Obonsawin & Esme Worthington, A Model of Personality
Change After TraumaticBrain Injury and the Development of the Brain Injury Personality
Scales, 78 J. NEUROLOGY, NEUROSURGERY & PSYCHIATRY 1239 (2007).

46.

O'Brien & Ferguson, supra note 43, at 297. See generally W. Huw Williams et al.,

Traumatic Brain Injury in a Prison Population:Prevalence and Risk for Re-Offending, 24

BRAIN INJ. 1184 (2010). Although most of the research involving this cohort has involved
prison inmates (and thus, predominantly those who had been initially charged with
felonies), some also focuses on jail inmates, a cohort that would include, in some
jurisdictions, those charged with misdemeanors who are unable to make bail. See CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY IN PRISONS AND JAILS: AN

UNRECOGNIZED PROBLEM (2007).
47. Moriarty et al., supra note 2, at 702. These claims are especially common in death
penalty cases. See, e.g., Anthony E. Giardino, Combat Veterans, Mental Health Issues, and
the Death Penalty:Addressing the Impact of Post-TraumaticStress Disorderand Traumatic
Brain Injury, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2955 (2009); Jessie A. Seiden, The Criminal Brain:
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which the defendant attacked and killed Bobbie Jo Stinnett, then eight
months pregnant.48 Montgomery strangled Stinnett, butchered her with
a kitchen knife, cut Stinnett's unborn child from the womb, and tried to
49
pass the baby off as her own. Montgomery was convicted in federal court
of a kidnapping resulting in death and was sentenced to
death.5 0 Montgomery's early childhood was marred by severe beatings
51
Her mother also
and sexual abuse at the hands of her stepfather.
when she
starting
her
trafficking
sexually
by
contributed to the abuse
men
adult
by
raped
gang
be
to
her
allowing
was a small child, "including
52
Years
keep."'
her
'earn
to
had
she
Lisa
telling
and
on multiple occasions
of extreme trauma led to significant mental illness and documented brain
damage resulting directly from the severe beatings and sexual abuse. As
a result of her years of torture at the hands of caregivers, Montgomery
"severed her connection with reality . . . ."53 and as her grip on reality
54
declined, she fantasized more and more about becoming pregnant.
In reviewing the case, the District Court noted the extensive details
of her lengthy history of physical and sexual abuse, brain impairments,
55
but
and resulting mental disabilities and personality disorders,
56
"[t]hese
that
stated
It
history.
that
of
impact
the
basically ignored
Frontal Lobe Dysfunction Evidence in Capital Proceedings, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 395 (2004). See
generally infra text accompanying note 150. However, these are not the only criminal law
cases in which TBI plays a part. See generally infra text accompanying notes 72-74.
48. United States v. Montgomery, 635 F.3d 1074, 1079-80 (8th Cir. 2011).
49. Id.
50. Montgomery v. Rosen, No. 21-5001, 2021 WL 116391, at *1, *6 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 11,
2021), rev'd en banc, No. 21-5001, 2021 WL 112524 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 11, 2021), vacated sub
nom. No. 20A122, 2021 WL 99974, at *1 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2021).
51. United States v. Montgomery, 635 F.3d 1074, 1080-81 (8th Cir. 2011); Montgomery
v. Barr, 507 F. Supp. 3d 711, 723 (N.D. Tex. 2020). For information on the long-lasting
impact of childhood trauma, see Amy T. Campbell, Addressing the Community Trauma of
Inequity Holistically: The Head and the Heart Behind StructuralInterventions, 98 DENvER
L. REV. 1, 8-9 (2021).
52. See Lisa Montgomery, supranote 6.
53. See id.
54. Id. (stating that Montgomery "gave birth to four children. After her fourth child was
born, her mother pressured her into an involuntary sterilization').
55. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Barr, 507 F. Supp. 3d 711, 733 n.4 (N.D. Tex. 2020) (citing
Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 8-9 (2011) (reasoning that clemency is the prerogative
granted to the executive to help ensure that justice is tempered with mercy)); Harbison v.
Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 187 (2009) ("Federal clemency is exclusively executive: Only the
President has the power to grant clemency for offenses under federal law."). Cf. To
William Charles Jarvis. Monticello, Sept. 28, 1820, in XV THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 277 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907) ("To consider the [federal] judges as the
ultimate arbiters of all constitutional questions . . . [is] a very dangerous doctrine indeed,
and one which would place us under the despotism of an oligarchy.").
56. Montgomery, 507 F. Supp. 3d at 733 n.4 (citing Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 8-9
(2011)).
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arguments read like a clemency petition . . . [and thus] this Court is not
the proper forum in which to make a request for clemency, which lies
within the exclusive province of the Executive Branch, not the Judicial

Branch." 57

With this backdrop, we need to consider the many different points of
the criminal trial process-pre-trial, at trial, and post-trial-at which
therapeutic jurisprudence could impact a case involving a defendant with
TBI. In an earlier article, two of the authors noted that "introduction of
a defendant's TBI could prove to be an effective tool during mitigation, in
order to provide a clue as to why he may have performed the crime with
which he was charged." 58 In fact, "[a] finding of TBI can also help to
demonstrate an individual's current cognitive and emotional functioning,
which will be important for a decision-maker to consider during
sentencing." 59 But, on further consideration, we believe that TBI
evidence could be significant in some criminal cases at all stages of the
criminal process.

Thus, beyond the range of cases we are discussing here, we believe
that TBI evidence may be relevant to such pre-trial matters as motion

practice, bail applications, decisions as to whether to enter into a plea
agreement, and preparing the defendant to testify and to hear evidence

that might be introduced against him. 60 But, for the purposes of this

57. Id.; see also Lisa Montgomery, supra note 6 ("The crime that Lisa committed, though
rare, is not unprecedented. More than a dozen women have committed similar crimes
around the country, and none, besides Lisa, are condemned to die. The crime itself is a
reflection of mental illness. But the Bush Justice Department, under Attorney General
Alberto Gonzales, decided that life imprisonment was not a sufficient punishment for her
crime.").
58. Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, "In the Wasteland of Your Mind": Criminology,
Scientific Discoveries and the Criminal Process, 4 VA. J. CRIM. L. 304, 354 n.171 (2016).
59. Id. at 353-54 n.171.
60. For more on bail, see, e.g., State v. Delacerda, 140 So.3d 1245, 1249 (La. Ct. App.
2014) (holding that a decision to revoke the bail of a defendant with TBI while the issue of
his mental competence to proceed was pending "harmless error" as it was not prejudicial).
For more on pleas, see, e.g., State v. Schaefer, 385 P.3d 918, 925-26 (Kan. 2016) (holding
that there was no abuse of discretion in finding that plea of defendant with TBI was
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, such that good cause did not exist for defendant to
withdraw his plea); United States v. Carter, No. 1:12-CR-29, 2013 WL 6668715, at *3 (E.D.
Tenn. Dec. 18, 2013) (holding that the defendant with TBI was competent to enter into a
guilty plea). For more on defendant's ability to testify, see, e.g., Morris v. State, 214 S.W.3d
159, 169 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2007), aff'd, 301 S.W.3d 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)
(affirming conviction, notwithstanding testimony from expert neuropsychologist that the
defendant with TBI could not testify to relevant evidence or be cross-examined). Two of the
co-authors (MLP & HEC) discuss these cases in a new webinar course on TBI and the Law,
taught under the auspices of Palo Alto University. See Michael L. Perlin & Heather Ellis
Cucolo, Traumatic Brain Injury and the Law, PALO ALTO UNIV.: CONCEPT,
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Article, we are limiting this portion of our inquiry to questions of search
and seizure, confessions, and waiver of rights.

1.

Pre-Trial

First, in the context of pre-trial matters, we consider what we
6 1 There are many motions that can be
characterize as "motion practice."
62
prior to trial, but the two most
filed by a criminal defense lawyer
to suppress evidence that was
motions
are
important, for these purposes,
63
exclude confessions or other
to
motions
and
seized from the defendant
it is highly likely that there
instances,
both
In
inculpatory statements.64
the fact finder can assess
that
so
hearing,
pre-trial
a
will be testimony at
65
each circumstance, the
In
suppressed.
be
should
whether the evidence
to (1) give consent
competent
was
defendant
the
question as to whether
an inculpatory
make
and
rights
Miranda
his
waive
(2)
to the search, or
assess.66
to
fact-finder
the
for
matter
statement is a
Although it has appeared clear from the caselaw for over fifty years
67
that the confession by an incompetent person is inadmissible, we know
that neither subnormal intelligence, "lack of education and illiteracy,"
nor "previous incidents of mental instability" are "necessarily
dispositive" of the issue of mental competence at the time the confession

https://training.concept.paloaltou.edu/courses/Traumatic-Brain-Injury-and-the-Law

(last

visited Dec. 4, 2021).
61. Edward Labaton, Book Review, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1269, 1269 (1991) ("[E]very civil
litigator recognizes the key role of motion practice to all but the most routine lawsuits
... ."). We believe it is just as critical to criminal litigation. See, e.g., ANTHONY G.
AMSTERDAM, 2 TRIAL MANUAL 5 FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES § 221-253A (5th ed.
1989); Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases: The Evolving
Standard of Care, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 323, 370 (1993) (as discussed in Rodney Uphoff,
Convicting the Innocent: Aberration or Systemic Problem?, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 739, 747 n.41
(2006)).
62. We are omitting from this discussion motions that might be filed by the prosecutor.
63. This flows from the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961), and its progeny.
64. This flows from the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966), and its progeny.
65. This excludes Mapp motions based on insufficiency of warrant as those typically do
not involve live testimony. They are much rarer. See, e.g., Steven Duke, Making Leon Worse,
95 YALE L.J. 1405, 1409 (1986); Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants
Seriously, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 1609, 1669 (2012). It has been estimated that suppression
motions are filed in about 10% of all criminal cases. See Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal
Costs of the Exclusionary Rule Revisited, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 223, 228 (1987).
66. For more on competency and these questions in general, see Michael L. Perlin,
Beyond Dusky and Godinez: Competency Before and After Trial, 21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 297,
300-02 (2003).
67. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207-11 (1960).
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is given. 68 Thus, it is critical that evidence of TBI be evaluated carefully
and sensitively. Remarkably, there has been only a handful of cases on
the question of competency to consent to a search, and courts have split
between those that have taken the position that mental competency is
relevant to any inquiry in determining voluntariness of a consent in such
circumstances and those that have concluded that there was "no
authority for the proposition that . . . incompetency renders consent to
the search invalid." 69 Again, such cases make it essential that TBI
evidence be carefully examined.
We know that TBI "may make a person ...
more likely to produce
false confessions," 7 0 and "even more at risk of incompetency . . . to waive
[constitutional]
rights
[such
as
the
privilege
against
selfincrimination]."71 In at least one case, a jury heard virtually no evidence
about a defendant's TBI, and-based in significant part on his
confession-sentenced him to death, a sentence that was ultimately
carried out. 72 In one case, involving a jailhouse admission, a defendant
with TBI unsuccessfully sought to exclude the introduction of recorded
telephone conversations (from when he was in jail), as he had no actual
memory of the events in question, and, as such, the conversations could
not be fairly characterized as admissions. 73

&

68. Perlin, supra note 66, at 300-01; see id. at 300-01 nn.35-38 (citing, inter alia, State
v. Jenkins, 268 S.E.2d 458, 463 (N.C. 1980)); State v. Osborne, 330 S.E.2d 447, 448 (Ga.
App. 1985); State v. Vickers, 291 S.E.2d 599, 604 (N.C. 1982); State v. Simpson, 334 S.E.2d
53, 59 (N.C. 1985).
69. Perlin, supra note 66, at 301 (citing United States v. Ocampo, 492 F. Supp. 1211
(E.D.N.Y. 1980) (competency relevant), and United States v. Flannery, 879 F.2d 863, No.
88-5605, 1989 WL 79731, at *4 (4th Cir. July 13, 1989) (finding competency irrelevant)). On
the specific question of the competency of a defendant with TBI to consent to a search, see,
e.g., United States v. Wendehake, No. 06-14040-CR, 2006 WL 3498613, at *16 (S.D. Fla.
Dec. 4, 2006) (finding, despite the defendant suffering from a cognitive disorder secondary
to a traumatic brain injury, that the disorder "had no impact whatsoever on his ability to
freely and voluntarily consent to the search and seizure"); Taylor v. State, 937 So.2d 590,
599 (Fla. 2006) (holding that a documented TBI did not affect the defendant's ability to
give free and voluntary consent to search his motel room).
70. John Niland & Riddhi Dasgupta, Texas Law's "Life or Death" Rule in Capital
Sentencing: ScrutinizingEighth Amendment Violations and the Caseof Juan Guerrero, Jr.,
41 ST. MARY'S L.J. 231, 262 (2009) (quoting I. Bruce Frumkin, MentalRetardation:A Primer
to Cope with Expert Testimony, 25 NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEF. ASS'N CORNERSTONE, Fall 2003,
at 6); see, e.g., Jerrod Brown et al., Confabulation in CorrectionalSettings: An Exploratory
Review, J.L. ENF'T, 2015, at 3 ("Inmates with a Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) may be more
likely to confabulate due to memory deficits and distortions of reality caused by damage to
the brain.").
71. Niland & Dasgupta, supra note 70, at 262 (quoting Frumkin, supra note 70, at 6).
72. State v. Clayton, 995 S.W.2d 468 (Mo. 1999) (en banc), as discussed in O'Brien
Ferguson, supra note 43, at 288-89.
73. People v. Matthews, No. 0980-2016, 2017 WL 4653566, at *5-6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct.
4, 2017).
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TBI also has a profound impact on a defendant's ability to waive
74
constitutional rights. The test for waiver has stayed basically the same
for almost eighty years: that the waiver was "an intentional
75
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."
Literally, tens of thousands of cases repeat the mantra that a waiver
76
must be "made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." Such a waiver
must be "voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and
deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception[,]" and
it must be "made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right
being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it."77
78
By way of example, consider the case of Ward v. Sternes, in which
federal habeas corpus was granted to a defendant who, because of his
TBI, could not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waive his right to
testify. 79 In Ward, the reviewing court noted that the trial court made no
"clear and straightforward" effort to ascertain that the defendant
understood the nature and implications of the right he was waiving. 80 On
81
the other hand, in State v. Larson, a conviction was affirmed in a case
in which a state appellate court concluded that the defendant's untreated
TBI "did not disrupt [his] ability to understand what he was doing or the

74. See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633 (1986) (stating that when a defendant
purports to waive a fundamental constitutional right, "itis the State that has the burden
of establishing a valid waiver"). For more on waiver in the specific context of a defendant
with TBI, see United States v. Duncan, 643 F.3d 1242, 1249 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. den., 566
U.S. 907 (2012), as discussed in Moriarty et al., supra note 2, at 716 (concluding that the
appellate court was "impressed by the neuroscience evidence"). On remand, the trial court
found the defendant competent to waive his rights, concluding:
1) The Defendant is likely suffering from a mental disease or defect to the extent
discussed in this Order; (2) The mental disease or defect did not prevent him from
understanding his legal position and the options available to him; and (3) The
mental disease or defect did not prevent him from making a rational choice among
his options.
United
2013).
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
2d 950,
80.
81.

States v. Duncan, No. 2:07-00023-EJL, 2013 WL 12057465, at *27 (D. Idaho Dec. 6,
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986).
209 F. Supp. 2d 950 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
See supra text accompanying notes 75-77; see also Ward v. Sternes, 250 F. Supp.
960 (C.D. 11. 2002).
Ward, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 959.
No. 65-CR-15-292, 2017 WL 2729601 (Minn. Ct. App. June 26, 2017).

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:215

228

consequences of his guilty plea, and that there was nothing about his
mental health that warranted the withdrawal of his guilty plea." 82

2.

At Trial
i. Incompetency

Consider the question of incompetency to stand trial. 83 We know
that, although traumatic brain injury may predispose a person to the
development of symptoms rendering them incompetent to stand trial,
courts have expressed skepticism about the presence of TBI and
causally-related incompetency. By way of example, in United States v.
Wiggin, the First Circuit found that there was no reasonable cause to
believe that the defendant was incompetent despite claims of memory
loss and cognitive impairment caused by traumatic brain injury because
the trial judge had seen the way that defendant interacted with his
lawyer. 8 4 Typical in this area of law is a decision by an intermediate
appellate court in New York: "Although defendant unquestionably
suffered a traumatic brain injury in the accident, he gave coherent
responses to the court's inquiries and there is nothing in the record to
indicate that he did not understand the charges against him or was

unable to assist in his defense." 85
Elsewhere, there is a handful of cases that consider competency to

stand trial in the context of defendants with TBI. In the case of Georgia
Dep't of Human Resources v. Drust,86 the Georgia Supreme Court applied
a state statute ordering a defendant-incompetent because of TBI-to be
transferred from a correctional facility to the authority of the
Department of Human Resources; on the other hand, in Harris v.

82. Id. at *3. The trial court had rejected the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea
and be evaluated by a neurologist and psychiatrist. Id. at *2.
83. For an analysis of a range of competency cases involving defendants with TBI in
which defense sought to introduce neuroimaging evidence, see Moriarty et al., supra note
2, at 715-16. Beyond the scope of this paper are investigations of competency to waive
counsel, or to plead guilty. See, e.g., Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993); Indiana v.
Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008). See generally Michael L. Perlin, "Dignity was the First to
Leave': Godinez v. Moran, Colin Ferguson, and the Trial of Mentally Disabled Criminal
Defendants, 14 BEHAv. Scis. & L. 61 (1996); Perlin, supra note 66; Christopher Slobogin,
Mental Illness and Self-Representation: Faretta, Godinez and Edwards, 7 OHIO STATE J.
CRIM. L. 391, 392 (2009).
84. United States v. Wiggins, 429 F.3d 31, 34-38 (1st Cir. 2005). In this case, defense
experts found the defendant to be incompetent to stand trial, but the court-appointed expert
disagreed. Id.
85. People v. Dowling, 937 N.Y.S.2d 729, 730 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (failing to present
expert testimony).

86.

448 S.E.2d 364 (Ga. 1994).
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Kuhlmann,87 the Second Circuit found that a state court's refusal to order
a competency hearing after the petitioner was shot in the head was not
unreasonable and thus not grounds for the granting of a writ of habeas
corpus. 88 The Georgia case notwithstanding, however, defendants with
89
on
TBI have rarely been successful at initial competency hearings,
90
upon
applications,
habeas
on
or
hearings,
applications for competency
alleging that their TBI should have triggered a competency-to-stand-trial

hearing. 91

ii. Insanity defense
92
Consider next the insanity defense. Although defendants with a
history of brain injury are more likely to be found not guilty by reason of
insanity than those defendants who did not present any neurological
testimony, 93 nonetheless, evidence of TBI is generally not enough to
94
support an insanity defense. According to Professor Litton, "[a]lthough
in some very rare cases the cognitive impairments from TBI can rise to
the level of insanity, the effects are more often relevant to a judgment of
diminished responsibility, which is relevant in mitigation at
sentencing."9 5 Note, in this context, that, in a previous article, two of the
authors (MLP & AJL) suggested that testimony about TBI might
"provide a clue" as to why the defendant committed the crime in

question.96
This becomes even more significant when we acknowledge how
negative and stereotyped beliefs fuel legislative, judicial, and jury
97
decisions about the insanity defense. If evidence of TBI is presented, it
87.
88.
89.
S.W.3d
90.
91.
United

346 F.3d 330 (2d Cir. 2003).
See id. at 355.
See, e.g., Scott v. Schiro, 567 F.3d 573, 578 (9th Cir. 2009); Morris v. State, 301
281, 307 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2009).
See United States v. Dahl, 807 F.3d 900, 901 (8th Cir. 2015).
See Harris,346 F.3d.; United States v. Dixon, 901 F.3d 1322, 1341 (11th Cir. 2018);
States v. Carter, No. 12-CR-29, 2013 WL 6668715, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 18, 2013).

See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCoLo, MENTAL DISABILITY
92.
LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ch. 14 (3d ed. 2020).

93. Jessica R. Gurley & David K. Marcus, The Effects of Neuroimaging and Brain
Injury on Insanity Defenses, 26 BEHAV. SCd. & L. 85, 92 (2008).
94. Paul Litton, TraumaticBrain Injury and a Divergence Between Moral and Criminal
Responsibility, 56 DUQ. L. REV. 35, 43-44 (2018).
95. Id.; see also Bowman v. State, 829 S.E.2d 139, 141-42 (Ga. 2019).
96. Perlin & Lynch, supra note 58, at 354 n.171.
97.

See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURIsPRUDENcE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE

(1994); Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity
Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 599 (1989-90); Michael L. Perlin, "The
Borderline Which Separated You from Me": The Insanity Defense, the AuthoritarianSpirit,
the Fearof Faking, and the Cultureof Punishment, 82 IOWAL. REV. 1375 (1997) [hereinafter
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may be possible to respond successfully to the damaging and inaccurate
mythic beliefs that plague the insanity defense. 98
Importantly, on the collateral question of the aftermath of a
conditional release following an insanity acquittal, the research reveals
that, where such release was provided in conjunction with community
services to provide support (e.g., assignment of a case manager to each
patient and multidisciplinary collaboration among mental health
professionals to ensure proper "medication management and specialized
treatment services"), it was significantly less likely that insanity
acquittees with TBI would have their conditional release status

revoked. 99

Most significant to consider is the reality that the vast majority of
insanity/TBI cases relate to adequacy of counsel questions, 100 the most
bizarre of which is Ansteensen v. Davis,10 1 in which trial counsel had told
the defendant that "a plea of ...
[NGRI] based on his traumatic brain
injury was 'not allowed by law."'102 Even absent such blatant inadequacy
of counsel, the inexperience of counsel in presenting TBI evidence in an
insanity defense context can be just as detrimental.103
Consider again, the Lisa Montgomery case. At trial, Montgomery
filed her notice of intent to assert the defense of insanity and to present
expert evidence relating to mental disease or defect. 104 She claimed that

childhood sexual and physical abuse by her stepfather had caused her to
suffer from pseudocyesis, a false belief of being pregnant that the Fourth
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders

classified as a somatoform disease.1 05 Defense counsel engaged mental
health experts Drs. Vilayanur Ramachandran and William Logan, both

Perlin, Borderline];Michael L. Perlin, The Insanity Defense: Nine Myths That Will Not Go
Away, in THE INSANITY DEFENSE: MULTIDISCIPLINARY VIEWS ON ITS HISTORY, TRENDS, AND
CONTROvERSIES 3 (Mark D. White ed., 2017).

98. Jane Campbell Moriarty, Seeing Voices: Potential Neuroscience Contributionsto a
Reconstruction of Legal Insanity, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 599, 601-02, n.9 (2016) (quoting
MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INANITY DEFENSE 229-30 (1994)).

99. Michael Vitacco et al., Evaluating Conditional Release in Not Guilty by Reason of
Insanity Acquittees: A ProspectiveFollow-Up Study in Virginia, 38 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 346,
353 (2014).
100. See infra Section III (on effectiveness of counsel in general).
101. No. 11-CV-01099-BNB, 2011 WL 6153107, at *1 (D. Colo. 2011).
102. Id. at *2.
103. See Kerrin Maureen McCormick, The Constitutional Right to Psychiatric
Assistance: Cause for Reexamination of Ake, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329, 1358-60 (1993)
(quoting People v. Anteensen, No. 07-CA-1852, 2009 WL 869855, at *3 (Colo. Ct. App.
2009)).
104. United States v. Montgomery, 635 F.3d 1074, 1082 (8th Cir. 2011).
105. Id. (citing AM. PSYCHIATRIC AsS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM-IV) 511 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV]).
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of whom diagnosed her with depression, borderline personality disorder,
106
post-traumatic stress disorder, and pseudocyesis.
testimony by Ruben
proffer
to
The defense unsuccessfully sought
Gur, Ph.D. that-based on neuropsychological, MRI, and PET
functional
and
structural
had
brain
testing-Montgomery's
107
"Dr. Gur
abnormalities that were consistent with pseudocyesis.
10 8
that
determined
and
supervised a PET scan of Montgomery's brain[,]"
and
system"
limbic
the
the results "revealed elevated activity throughout
concluded
Gur
Dr.
"109
..
..
"increased activity in the somatomotor region
that "Montgomery suffered from functional abnormalities consistent
with the diagnosis of pseudocyesis" based on a study that showed that
heightened activity in the hypothalamus produced pseudopregnancy in
rats.110 "Montgomery's MRI revealed structural abnormalities, including
reduced brain volume in the right parietal lobes and right medial gray
Dr. Gur was hesitant to say that Montgomery's brain
matter." 1
abnormalities caused her to commit the crime, but testified that the
purpose of the PET scan was "to identify any brain abnormalities that
might underlie her extreme behavior" and not "to diagnose Montgomery
with pseudocyesis or any other condition. ... "112
The government requested a Daubert hearing and presented experts
to challenge the scientific validity of the MRI and PET testing testified
11
to by Dr. Gur. 3 To break down Dr. Gur's expert opinion, the government

106.

Id.

For years, Montgomery was physically and sexually abused by her stepfather.
When she was sixteen, her mother and stepfather divorced... From childhood on,
Montgomery had endured a tumultuous relationship with her mother.
Montgomery married Carl Boman, her step-brother, when she turned eighteen in
August 1986. She had her first child in January 1987, and three more in the three
years that followed. In 1990, Montgomery underwent the sterilization procedure
described above. The procedure was successful, and a pretrial hysterosalpingogram
confirmed that the sterilization rendered Montgomery unable to become pregnant.
Montgomery claimed that her mother and Boman forced her to undergo the
sterilization procedure.
Id. at 1080-81.
107. Id. at 1082-83, 1090.
108. Id. at 1088 ("PET scanners measure the level of activity in different areas of the
brain.").

109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1092.
112. Id. at 1088. Dr. Gur also testified that "the brain she has may explain at least part
of what happened." Id. at 1092.
113. Id. at 1082 (relying upon Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993); FED. R. EvID. 702, 403).
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presented experts to explain the differences between MRI results and
PET scan results: an MRI "provides quantitative analysis on brain
anatomy, brain structure, while PET provides quantitative results on
brain physiology, brain function."1 1 4As to the PET scan, the government
expert, Alan Evans, Ph.D., conceded that although the PET scan result
was not inconsistent with pseudocyesis, it was also not inconsistent with
"numerous [other] neurological states, both normal and pathological,"
and therefore did not provide a causal connection to the killing.115
Government expert Helen Mayberg, Ph.D., testified that "no PET scan
pattern indicates pseudocyesis" and that PET scan results cannot be used
to identify or diagnose psychiatric disorders.1 1 6 Drs. Evans and Mayberg
also took issue with Dr. Gur's methodology and argued that Dr. Gur's
principles and methods were unreliable.11 7 They claimed that Dr. Gur
had calculated the data from the normative population differently than

he had calculated Montgomery's data.118 The experts testified that they
were able to duplicate his calculations only if they employed one method
for Montgomery and a different method for the control group. 119
As to the MRI evidence testified to by Dr. Gur, government expert
Dr. Evans explained that Montgomery's results were within the normal
range and that approximately fifty percent of the population would have
comparable results. 120 Dr. Gur rendered his conclusion based on his
"eyeball" comparison, that Montgomery's right parietal and medial gray
matter appeared abnormally low, and according to Dr. Evans, Dr. Gur
had failed to scientifically show that Montgomery's left-right difference
was abnormal. 121

114. Montgomery, 635 F.3d at 1082 n.4.
115. Id. at 1088.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1088-89.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1082-83.
120. Id. at 1092. Montgomery's ventricle measurements were one standard deviation
from normal, and Dr. Evans stated that there would be similar results in approximately
thirty percent of the population. Id.
121. Id. at 1093. This debate highlights one of the dangers of overreliance on
neuroimaging for both traumatic brain injuries, which are far easier to demonstrate

through both structural and functional imaging, and mental illness, which is notoriously
difficult to conclusively show on imaging. An expert needs to be able to demonstrate through
both imaging and assessment, where appropriate, that mental illness exists. If that mental
illness stems from organic brain trauma or visible structural differences in the brain, the
expert must make clear that s/he has limitations in what can be proven through imaging,
and may need to use multiple methodologies to show that behavior associated with a
particular mental illness was derived from structural/functional brain abnormalities. Overrelying on imaging is problematic. See David E.J. Linden, The Challenges and Promise of
Neuroimagingin Psychiatry, 73 NEURON 8, 8 (2012) ("Neuroimaging is central to the quest
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As a result of the defense's failure to offer scientifically supported
evidence at the Daubert hearing, the trial court excluded evidence of the
PET scan results on the ground that they did not show any significant
abnormality. 122 Although initially the trial court planned to allow Dr.
Gur to testify on the abnormalities viewed in the PET scans, it later
123
In
expressed concerns about the reliability of Dr. Gur's analysis.
Gur's
Dr.
over
dispute
the
that
concerned
was
particular, the trial court
124
methodology would confuse the jury.
125
Montgomery's
Left without the support of brain imaging evidence,
through the
insanity
of
defense
the
support
to
attempted
attorney
M.D., and
Ramachandran,
Vilayanur
experts
defense
of
testimony
experts
both
trial,
the
of
phase
guilt
the
At
M.D.126
Logan,
William
in a
was
delusion,
pseudocyesis
severe
had
Montgomery
that
testified
the
appreciate
to
unable
was
and
crime,
the
during
state
dissociative
127
Park
Dr.
expert,
government's
The
acts.
her
of
quality
and
nature
Dietz, agreed that Montgomery suffered from depression, borderline
personality disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder but did not
128
Dr. Dietz further opined
diagnose her as suffering from pseudocyesis.

for a biological foundation of psychiatric diagnosis but so far has not yielded clinically
relevant biomarkers for mental disorders.").
122. Montgomery, 635 F.3d at 1083.
123. Id. at 1090.
124. Id. at 1089 (although trial court erred by excluding expert's testimony on PET scan,
which showed abnormalities, any error was harmless under Daubert because testimony had
minimal probative value because PET scan was not used for the specific disease defendant
claimed and abnormalities do not predict behavior); see also Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d
1148, 1165 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted) (affirming exclusion of PET scan under
Daubert); People v. Protsman, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 819, 822-23 (Ct. App. 2001) (depublished)
(affirming exclusion of PET scan evidence under California's state law on this question);
People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976), superseded by CAL. EVID. CODE § 351.1 (West
1983), as recognized in People v. Wilkinson, 94 P.3d 551 (Cal. 2004); see generally People v.
Bowman, No. B242467, 2014 WL 718416, at *6 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2014).
125. Montgomery, 635 F.3d at 1083. After the jury had been selected and before opening
statements, the court ruled that Dr. Gur's testimony regarding his PET scan analysis would
be excluded, finding that the evidence had minimal probative value because the
abnormalities were consistent with many disorders, including pseudocyesis. Id. We know,
however, that the introduction of brain scan evidence, when supported by reliable expert
testimony, will lead mock jurors to be more predisposed to mitigation of sentence in death

penalty cases. See Edith Greene & Brian Cahill, Effects of NeuroimagingEvidence on Mock
Juror DecisionMaking, 30 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 280, 282 (2012).
126. Montgomery, 635 F.3d at 1082-83.
127. Dr. Ramachandran testified that Montgomery suffered from a severe pseudocyesis
delusion and was in a dissociative state when she killed Stinnett and delivered the baby. Id.
at 1083-84.
128. Id. at 1082.
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that Montgomery "was entirely capable of appreciating that she engaged
in a lengthy and elaborate plan [to commit kidnapping and murder]." 129
He testified that Montgomery was not delusional, because she gave
numerous inconsistent statements about her actions and the origins of
the baby both before and after confessing to police that she had killed the
baby's mother, whereas a delusional person would have repeated the
same statements consistently.130 Relying on Dr. Dietz's opinion, the jury
rejected Montgomery's insanity defense and unanimously found her
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the capital crime of kidnapping
resulting in death. 131
At the penalty phase, the jury voted for death despite the mitigating
testimony given by Dr. Logan and Dr. Ruth Kuncel, Ph.D., that, at the
time of the killing, her ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of her
actions was substantially impaired and she suffered from a severe mental
or emotional disturbance. 132 On appeal, Montgomery argued that the
trial court committed reversible error at both the guilt and penalty
phases by excluding Dr. Gur's evidence. 133
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision, ruling that the
defense failed to show in the Daubert hearing that Dr. Gur's opinion was
based on scientifically valid principles where he mentioned only one
scientific study in passing. 134 That study, performed on rats and
analyzing their sexual activity, was described in detail by government

The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders(DSM-IV) defines
pseudocyesis as "a false belief of being pregnant that is associated with objective
signs of pregnancy, which may include abdominal enlargement, ...
reduced
menstrual flow, amenorrhea, subjective sensation of fetal movement, nausea,
breast engorgement and secretions, and labor pains at the expected date of
delivery." AM. PsYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 511 (4th ed. text revision 2000). The DSM-IV classifies
pseudocyesis as a somatoform disorder. Id. "The common feature of Somatoform
Disorders is the presence of physical symptoms that suggest a general medical
condition, ... and are not fully explained by a general medical condition, by the
direct effects of a substance, or by another mental disorder."
Id. at 485.
129. Id. at 1085.
130. Id. at 1084.
131. Id. at 1085.
132. Id. ("Montgomery asserted the following mitigating factors, among others, to
support her case for life imprisonment: her capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of her
conduct or to conform her conduct to the requirements of the law was significantly impaired;
she committed the offense under severe mental and emotional disturbance; she had reared
and supported four good children, to whom she had offered advice, nurturance, and
emotional support and would continue to do so if she was sentenced to life imprisonment.").
133. Id. at 1091.
134. Id.
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expert Dr. Mayberg, who testified without rebuttal that the research was
135
Even if Dr. Gur's interpretation of the
not applicable to Montgomery.
PET scan was arguably admissible under the Federal Death Penalty
136
Act's low threshold for admissibility, the error to exclude was harmless,
used to diagnose pseudocyesis-the
be
not
because the PET scan could
Dr. Gur conceded that
defense-and
basis for Montgomery's insanity
cause Montgomery to
not
did
and
abnormalities do not predict behavior
137
declared that the
Circuit
Eighth
the
Ultimately,
commit the crime.
by the
outweighed
was
and
evidence had minimal probative value
138
overwhelming aggravating evidence.
135. Id. ("Other than his mention of the study on rats, there was no evidence offered to
show the scientific reliability of Dr. Gur's opinion. Similarly, no evidence was offered that
individuals suffering from other somatoform disorders have somatomotor abnormalities
similar to Montgomery's . . . . The opinion that the abnormalities were consistent with
pseudocyesis, however, did not rise to the level of scientific knowledge.").
136. Id. at 1092; see also Hose v. Chi. Nw. Transp. Co., 70 F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1995)
("[N]o question [exists] that the PET scan is scientifically reliable for measuring brain
function.").

137.

Montgomery, 635 F.3d at 1092. Dr. Gur did not proffer an opinion that the brain

abnormalities caused Montgomery to commit the act, but rather, that the abnormalities

contributed to her actions and "may explain at least part of what happened." Id. The
Montgomery court held that Dr. Gur's testimony did not meet the reliability standard of
Rule 702. Id. at 1090 (citing Tamraz v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 620 F.3d 665, 670 (6th Cir. 2010)).
Further, the Montgomery court explained that, "[a]lthough Rule 702's inquiry is 'a flexible
one,' it requires that the principles underlying the proposed submission be scientifically
valid." Id. (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594-95). Scientific
knowledge requires "more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation." Daubert, 509
U.S. at 590 (1993); see also United States v. Purkey, 428 F.3d 738, 757-58 (8th Cir. 2005)
(holding it improper to exclude defendant's expert's testimony that defendant suffered from
fetal alcohol syndrome when it was supported by facts).
On how Daubertdecisions are disproportionately likely to favor the prosecution, see
Perlin & Lynch, supra note 58, at 343-44, and Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, 'My
Brain Is So Wired": Neuroimaging's Role in Competency Cases Involving Persons with
Mental Disabilities,27 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 73, 93-94 (2018) ("[J]udges treated biologicallybased evidence in criminal cases involving questions of mental disability law (via
privileging and subordination) so as to conform to the judges' pre-existing positions."),
relying on research reported in Nicholas Scurich & Adam Shniderman, The Selective Allure
(Sept. 10, 2014), http://journals.plos.org/
of Neuroscientific Explanations, 9 PLoS ONE
7 29
plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.010 5 ); see also Susan Rozelle, Daubert,
Schmaubert: Criminal Defendants and the Short End of the Science Stick, 43 TULSA L. REV.
597, 598 (2007) ("[T]he game of scientific evidence looks fixed.").
138.
Nevertheless, we conclude that what we said in Purkey is of equal force in this case:
"[A]lthough we recognize that a jury may be more likely to believe that someone
suffers from a problem if its cause is explained, we nevertheless harbor no doubt
that considering the minimal probative value of the evidence and the
overwhelming evidence and jury findings of serious aggravating factors, its
exclusion was harmless."
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The Eighth Circuit decision highlights the fundamental unfairness
to a defendant when expert testimony is unsubstantiated in the scientific
and medical communities.1 39 Studies have questioned the beneficial
weight of neuroimaging-based testimony,140 and as a result, counsel must
be especially cognizant of the potential detriment in failing to adequately
present such evidence.141 This supports the recommendation that is
offered later in this Article-that counsel use the utmost diligence in
choosing a qualified expert when dealing with issues involving brain
abnormalities or questions of brain damage in a death penalty case. 142
Particularly, attorneys must understand the range of disabilities that
could support an insanity defense (and/or mitigation at sentencing) and
ensure that they are presenting persuasive medical and scientific
evidence to support their theory of the case.

3.

The Death Penalty
i. Introduction

At the outset, it is clear that claims of brain injury are especially
common in death penalty cases. 143 In this Section of this Article, we will
consider these issues
in three
contexts-findings
of future
dangerousness, mitigation, and competency to be executed-and will
then contextualize them through a closer consideration of the case of Lisa
Montgomery.

Montgomery, 635 F.3d. at 1092 (citing United States v. Purkey, 428 F.3d 738, 758 (8th Cir.
2005) (another federal death penalty case that was handled and lost by Montgomery's
attorney)).
139. See infra Section III.
140. See Darby Aono, Gideon Yaffe & Hedy Kober, Neuroscientific Evidence in the
Courtroom: A Review, 4 COGNITIVE RScH. 40 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1186/s41235-0190179-y (discussing studies on the effects of neuroscientific and neuroimaging- based
testimony in jury decisions); see also James Gaines, Brain Scans in the Courts: Prosecutor's
Dream
or
Civil
Rights
Nightmare?, INSIDE
SCI.
(Mar.
14,
2018),
http://www.insidescience.org/news/brain-scans-courts-prosecutors-dream-or-civil-rightsnightmare.
141. Aono et al., supranote 140, at 3 (citing Deborah W. Denno, The Myth of the DoubleEdged Sword: An Empirical Study of Neuroscience Evidence in Criminal Cases, 56 B.C. L.
REV. 493, 508 (2015)) ("Importantly, 87% of ... Strickland claims included arguments that
defense counsel presented insufficient neuroscientific evidence. Furthermore, 27.65% of the
reported Strickland claims were successful (an extraordinarily high rate), with defense
counsel's inadequate use of neuroscientific evidence forming the basis of all but one
successful claim.").
142. See infra Section III.
143. See, e.g., Giardino, supra note 47; see also, e.g., Seiden, supra note 47.
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ii. Future Dangerousness
It has been black letter law for 45 years that a state statutory scheme
requiring the jury to determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, whether
there was a "probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts
of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society" is
1 45
144
the
About seven years later, in Barefoot v. Estelle,
constitutional.

Supreme Court countenanced testimony on future dangerousness in a
death penalty case in which the witness had never personally examined
146
One of the lynchpins of the Barefoot
or evaluated the defendant.
decision was Justice White's conclusion that, as a result of vigorous
cross-examination, "the jury will ... be able to separate the wheat from
147
the chaff."
144. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 268 (1976).
145. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), superseded by statute, Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, as recognized in
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000); see generally PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 92, §§
17.2-1 to 17-2.2, at 17-3 to 17-15; Michael L. Perlin, The Supreme Court, the Mentally
DisabledCriminalDefendant, PsychiatricTestimony in Death Penalty Cases, and the Power
of Symbolism: Dulling the Ake in Barefoot's Achilles Heel, 3 N.Y. L. SCH. HUMAN RTs. ANN.
91 (1985).
146. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 896; cf. id. at 926 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Paul C.
Giannelli, The Admissiblity of Novel Scientific Evidence: Fyre v. United States, a HalfCentury Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1237 (1980)) (cautioning that the "major danger of
scientific evidence is its potential to mislead the jury" and that "an aura of scientific
infallibility may shroud the evidence and thus lead the jury to accept it without critical
scrutiny"), construed in Michael L. Perlin, "Your Corrupt Ways Had Finally Made You
Blind": ProsecutorialMisconduct and the Use of "EthnicAdjustments" in Death Penalty
Cases of Defendants with Intellectual Disabilities, 65 AM. U.L. REV. 1437, 1452 n.81 (2016);
see Michael L. Perlin, 'Deceived Me into Thinking/I Had Something to Protect": A
Therapeutic JurisprudenceAnalysis of When Multiple Experts Are Necessary in Cases in
Which Fact-FindersRely on Heuristic Reasoning and "OrdinaryCommon Sense," 13 L.J.
Soc. JUST. 88, 90 (2020) [hereinafter Deceived Me].
147. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 899 n.7; see Deceived Me, supra note 146, at 90. One
commentator has characterized this as a "cavalier attitude toward indiscriminate
acceptance of scientifically unreliable testimony." Cathleen C. Herasimchuk, A Practical
Guide to the Admissibility of Novel Expert Evidence in Criminal Trials Under FederalRule
702, 22 SAINT MARY'S L.J. 181, 201 (1990). Significantly, Barefoot led researchers to write,
some six years later, "[W]e have yet to find a single word of praise for, or in defense of
Barefoot, in the literature of either science or law." D. Michael Risinger, Mark P. Denbeaux
& Michael J. Saks, Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons
of Handwriting Identification 'Expertise," 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731, 779-80 n.215 (1989).
More than thirty years after that article was written, such a single word can still not be
found. For more recent critical articles about Barefoot, see, for example, James Acker, Snake
Oil with a Bite: The Lethal Veneer of Science and Texas's Death Penalty, 81 ALB. L. REV.
751, 763-69 (2017); Mayra Reyes, Danger! The Defendant Is 'Disturbed."Risks of Using
PsychiatricAssessments to PredictFuture Dangerousness,17 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 141, 16263 (2017); Jaymes Fairfax-Columbo & David DeMatteo, Reducing the Dangers of Future
Dangerousness Testimony: Applying the Federal Rules of Evidence to Capital Sentencing,
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The problems seen in Barefoot continue to plague the legal system
today. 14 8 As noted in the 2019 Columbia Law Review article, Miller v.
Alabama and the Problem of Prediction,"[s]ubstantial
empirical evidence
since Barefoot suggests the adversarial process indeed cannot be trusted
to sort out reliable evidence on future dangerousness. Studies of juries,
prosecutors, and psychologists all indicate that predictions of future
dangerousness are no better than random guesses." 149
How does this relate to defendants with TBI? In his clinical
evaluations of death row inmates, Professor Jonathan Pincus found that
most had been victims of child abuse, had sustained traumatic brain
injuries in childhood, and had been dually diagnosed with ADHD and
conduct disorder.150
There is no longer any question that defendants with traumatic brain
injury have been executed. 151 Of course, there is always the problem of

25 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1047, 1056-61 (2017). Barefoot continues to be perceived as
good law, and continues to be regularly cited in published, appellate cases. See, e.g., Ex
Parte Wood, No. WR-45,500-02, 2018 WL 6076407, at *2 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2018); In re
Detention of Parsons, No. 46-1-II, 2015 WL 4756464, at *6 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015).
148. See, e.g., Fairfax-Columbo & DeMatteo, supra note 147.
149. Mary Marshall, Miller v. Alabama and the Problem of Prediction, 119 COLUM. L.
REV. 1633, 1656 (2019).
150. Jonathan H. Pincus, Aggression, Criminality, and the FrontalLobes, in THE HUMAN
FRONTAL LOBES: FUNCTIONS AND DISORDERS 547, 554-55 (Bruce L. Miller & Jeffrey L.
Cummings eds., 1999) (noting that most of the individuals with frontal lobe damage who
were on death row sustained brain damage in their infancy); see also John Matthew Fabian,
Forensic NeuropsychologicalAssessment and Death Penalty Litigation, 33 APR CHAMPION
24, 26 (Apr. 2009) (reporting a study finding that 61% of habitually violent offenders had a
history of brain injuries); Redding, supra note 40, at 56-57.
151. According to Dr. Dorothy Otnow Lewis, a renowned researcher in psychology
studying death penalty cases involving defendants with mental disabilities, the majority of
inmates on death row have some form of brain dysfunction. See generally Dorothy Otnow
Lewis et al., Psychiatric, Neurological, and PsychoeducationalCharacteristicsof 15 Death
Row Inmates in the United States, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 838 (1986) [hereinafter Death
Row Inmates]; Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., Neuropsychiatric, Psychoeducational, and
Family Characteristicsof 14 Juveniles Condemned to Death in the United States, 145 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 584 (1988). In one study, she found that, of 14 juveniles sentenced to death,
all had suffered head trauma, most in car accidents but many by beatings as well. See id.
at 585-88. Reviewing her work evaluating dozens of death row inmates, Dr. Otnow Lewis
has concluded that, almost without exception, they have damaged brains. See Death Row
Inmates at 840-41. Most, like Lisa Montgomery, were also the victims of vicious battering.
See id.; see also Mark D. Cunningham & Mark P. Vigen, Death Row Inmate Characteristics,
Adjustment, and Confinement: A CriticalReview of the Literature, 20 BEHAv. SC. & L. 191,
191 (2002) ("Histories of significant neurological insult are common, as are developmental
histories of trauma, family disruption, and substance abuse."); David Freedman & David
Hemenway, Precursorsof Lethal Violence: A Death Row Sample, 50 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1757,
1757, 1762 (2000) (reporting that, of 16 cases sampled, 12 had a history of traumatic brain
injury); John Bessler, Torture and Trauma: Why the Death Penalty Is Wrong and Should
Be Strictly ProhibitedBy American and InternationalLaw, 58 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 4 (2019)
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the "double-edged sword": although "brain injuries should be mitigating
they run the risk of aggravating the culpability calculus since
...
increased impulsivity and decreased self-control suggest future
dangerousness."152
Consider next those defendants with intellectual disabilities. In
153
Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court found that subjecting persons
with intellectual disabilities to the death penalty violated the Eighth
Amendment, reasoning, in part, that this population had "diminished
capacities to understand and process information, to communicate, to
abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical
reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of
others." 154 Certainly, severely brain-injured individuals may also be at
similar risk, as "[t]heir cognitive disabilities can render them unable to
effectively assist their counsel and their behavioral impairments may
155
make them poor witnesses on the stand."
156
By
Consider how these issues are constructed in individual cases.
157
a
involving
case
penalty
death
a
State,
v.
Daniel
in
way of example,
rejected
court
the
a
child,
as
TBI
lobe
frontal
suffered
had
who
defendant
the defendant's arguments that the jury's finding of future
15
dangerousness was in error. 8 The appellate court found that the
defendant "had demonstrated an escalating pattern of disrespect for the

&

(quoting GAIL S. ANDERSON, BIOLOGICAL INFLUENcES ON CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 209 (2007))
("In one U.S. study of 15 death-row inmates, . . . all had suffered serious head injuries prior
to their offense.").
152. Robert J. Smith et al., The Failure of Mitigation?, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1221, 1232
(2014). For a list of cases, see id. at 1232-1233. For more information on brain injury as a
mitigating factor, see infra section IJ(iii)(3) on mitigation.
153. 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002).
154. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002). On defendants' regular lack of success
on Atkins claims in Fifth Circuit cases, see Michael L. Perlin, Talia Roitberg Harmon
Sarah Wetzel, "Man Is Opposed to Fair Play": An Empirical Analysis of How the Fifth
Circuit Has Failed to Take Seriously Atkins v. Virginia, 11 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POLY 451
(forthcoming 2021).
155. Laura Snodgrass & Brad Justice, "Death is Different": Limits on the Imposition of
the Death Penalty to TraumaticBrain Injuries, 26 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 81, 89 (2007).
156. In the Montgomery case, the excluded MRI testimony of Dr. Gur, see supra text
accompanying notes 97-114, attempted to explain how the defendant's right parietal
dysfunction "manifests itself behaviorally in loss of sense of self, difficulties in emotion
processing, attentional neglect and depressed or flat affect." United States v. Montgomery,
635 F.3d 1074, 1092 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Dr. Gur's report).
157. 485 S.W.3d 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
158. Id. at 32.
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law," 159 and noted further that his apparent lack of remorse was a factor
in this assessment. 16 0
In United States v. Witt, a concurring opinion (to an opinion
subsequently vacated) noted pointedly:
[T]he probability is indeed reasonable that any one [court]
member might have embraced the uninvestigated and omitted
mitigating evidence regarding an undisputed recent motorcycle
accident, the undisputed concomitant closed-head injury, and
expert testimony supporting the simple possibility of a traumatic
brain injury. Coupled with the emotionally impactful, yet
missing, remorse evidence Deputy Sheriff LF could have supplied
to rebut the prosecution's argument the appellant felt no
remorse, I find the existence of a reasonable probability,
sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome of this case.

159. Id.
160. Id. at 32-33 (describing instances where defendant had bragged about his crime);
see also United States v. Montgomery, 10 F. Supp. 3d 801, 846 (W.D. Tenn. 2014) (stating
that defendant's mere silence cannot be probative of lack of remorse); United States v. Caro,
597 F.3d 608, 629-30 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting that federal courts are divided over whether
using silence as evidence of lack of remorse violates the Fifth Amendment, and inclining to
follow those holding it to be violative); United States v. Umana, 707 F. Supp. 2d 621, 636
(W.D.N.C. 2010) ("[T]he Fifth Amendment limits proof of lack of remorse to 'affirmative
words or conduct' expressed by the defendant." (quoting Caro, 597 F.3d at 627)); United
States v. Roman, 371 F. Supp. 2d 36, 50 (D.P.R. 2005) ("[G]overnment may not urge the
applicability of [lack of remorse] on information that has a substantial possibility of
encroaching on [a defendant's] constitutional right to remain silent." (citation omitted)).
But see Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Recognizing ConstitutionalRights at
Sentencing, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 47, 65 (2011) ("Most states provide for increased sentences
for those defendants who fail to express remorse for their crimes. Federal courts likewise
have routinely imposed longer sentences on those who do not express remorse.") (footnotes
omitted) (citations omitted).
However, juries often perceive signs of TBI as a lack of remorse if they are unaware
of defendant's TBI. See Barbara C. Fisher, NeuropsychologicalAspects of a Mild Closed
Brain Injury in Children, 1 ANN. 2000 ATLA-CLE 1131 at *2 (2000) (discussing how
behavior that flows from TBI can cause the "false impression of a lack of remorse"). See
also, on the possible relationship between TBI and perceptions of lack of remorse in death
penalty cases, United States v. Witt, 73 M.J. 738, 839-40 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2014)
(Saragosa, J., concurring), vacated, 75 M.J. 380 (C.A.A.F. 2016).
On the impact of juror perceptionsof remorse in death penalty cases (and how those
perceptions may be wildly inaccurate, especially in cases in which defendants are medicated
at their trials), see Michael L. Perlin, "Merchants and Thieves, Hungry for Power":
Prosecutorial Misconduct and Passive Judicial Complicity in Death Penalty Trials of
Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501, 1531-33 (2016)
[hereinafter Perlin, Merchants]; William S. Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors
Vote Life or Death: Operative Factorsin Ten FloridaDeath Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRaM.
L. 1, 51-53 (1988).
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There is ample evidence to establish prejudice-that just one
161
member would hear it all and decide against death.

iii. Mitigation
The key elements of mitigation were articulated over forty years ago:
suffering evidences

expiation or

"

"whether the offender's
inspires compassion;

"

whether the offender's cognitive and/or volitional impairment
at the time he committed the crime affected his responsibility
for his actions, and thereby diminished society's need for
revenge;

"

whether the offender, subjectively analyzed, was less affected
than the mentally normal offender by the deterrent threat of
capital punishment at the time he committed the crime; and

"

whether the exemplary value of capitally punishing the
offender, as objectively perceived by reasonable persons,
would be attenuated by the difficulty those persons would
16 2
have identifying with the executed offender."

163
the Court held that the Eighth and
Thus, in Lockett v. Ohio,
Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer not be precluded
from considering any mitigating factors of the defendant's character or
record as a basis for a sentence less than death. 164 Then, in Eddings v.
Oklahoma,165 the Court held that the sentencing authority must consider
166
There, the defendant had been the
any relevant mitigating evidence.
with mental and emotional
disturbed,
victim of child abuse, emotionally
age. 167 Subsequently, in
chronological
his
development at a level below
1
Penry v. Lynaugh, 68 the Court held that mitigating evidence of a

161. Witt, 73 M.J. at 840.
162. James S. Liebman & Michael J. Shepard, Guiding Capital Sentencing Discretion
Beyond the "Boiler Plate": Mental Disorder as a Mitigating Factor, 66 GEo. L.J. 757, 818
(1978).
163. 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
164. Id.
165. 455 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1982).
166. Id. at 114.
167. Id. at 107-08.
168. 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989).
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defendant's mental retardation and childhood abuse has relevance to his
moral culpability beyond the scope of the "special issues" that jurors must
consider in weighing punishment. 169 Without such information, jurors
cannot express their "reasoned moral response" in determining whether
the death penalty is the appropriate punishment. 170
Significantly, in 2005, the American Bar Association called for the
implementation of these policies and procedures: "Defendants should not

be executed or sentenced to death if, at the time of the offense, they had
significant limitations in both their intellectual functioning and adaptive
behavior, as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills,
resulting from mental retardation, dementia, or a traumatic brain

injury."171

In the case of Lisa Montgomery, despite the ABA's recommendation
that a defense attorney "must .. . at minimum" work with a "mitigation

specialist," 172 defense counsel did not engage one. 173 This is all especially

significant in light of the fact that the use of neurobiological evidence in
criminal trials has increased over time and is usually used for
mitigation.1 7 4 "Clearly, the existence of brain damage is a factor which

169. Id. at 322.
170. Id. at 319.
171. Recommendations of the American BarAssociation Section of Individual Rights and
Responsibilities Task Force on Mental Disability and the Death Penalty, 54 CATH. U.L. REV.
1115, 1115 (2005) (emphasis added); see PERLIN & CUcoLO, supra note 92, at §17-4.1.5.
172. AM. BAR. ASs'N,, Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, reprinted in 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 925, 959 (2003),
https://www. americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/death-penaltyrepresentati

&

on/2003guidelines.pdf; see also Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of
Defense Teams in Death Penalty Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677, 677 (2008). "A mitigation
specialist is . . . an indispensable member of the defense team throughout all capital
proceedings." United States v. Kreutzer, 61 M.J. 293, 302 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (quoting AM. BAR.
Ass'N, Guidelinesfor the Appointment and Performanceof Defense Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases, reprinted in 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 959 (2003)).On the "centrality" of the
mitigation specialist to the work of defense counsel in such cases, see Mark E. Olive
Russell Stetler, Using the Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Functionof Defense
Teams in Death Penalty Cases to Change the Picturein Post-Conviction, 36 HOFsTRA L. REV.
1067, 1076-78 (2008).
173. Hannah Murphy, Lisa Montgomery Suffered Years of Abuse and Trauma. The
United States Killed Her Anyway, ROLLING STONE (Jan. 22, 2021, 3:22 PM),
https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features/lisa-montgomery-kelley-henrydeath-penalty-capital-punishment-1117592/ (discussing Montgomery's capital appellate
attorney, Kelley Henry).
174. Nita A. Farahany, Neuroscience and Behavioral Genetics in US Criminal Law: An
Empirical Analysis, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 485, 491-92 (2015); Denno, supra note 131, at
503, 544.
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175
Thus, according to an important
may be considered in mitigation."
research article by a neuropsychologist and a physician:

An ability to describe how a particular injury may have impacted
an individual's capacity to make good choices and to demonstrate
reasonable judgment can be very helpful in criminal cases,
especially in capital mitigation. In our experience, these cases
ideally would demonstrate well-documented brain injuries,
including medical records and be significant injuries in order to
provide strong mitigation. 176
It is clear that "[t]he presence and severity of brain damage can be a
critical factor in determining whether a death sentence is an appropriate
77
It stands to reason that the "introduction of a
punishment."1
defendant's TBI could prove to be an effective tool during mitigation, in
order to provide a clue as to why he may have performed the crime with
78
In one famous study, every one of fourteen
which he was charged."1
179
In
showed evidence of brain injury.
evaluated
death row defendants
that
recommended
was
it
veterans,
on
solely
another article focusing
"presenting . . . TBI . . . evidence to a sentencer during the sentencing
phase of a capital trial represents one way to avoid subjecting combat
80
veterans to the death penalty."1
There is some case law in accord. In State v. Sireci,181 the Florida
Supreme Court affirmed upon appeal a new sentencing hearing for a
defendant because he failed to receive competent psychiatric
examinations to adequately investigate possible brain damage. 182 On the
other hand, although the initial panel decision in a Ninth Circuit case
found counsel's work at trial deficient and "especially damaging to
Mann's defense at sentencing," as he had failed to seek and present
results of neuropsychological testing which would likely have shown the
83
defendant's TBI,i the full court vacated, concluding that, even if the

175. Robinson v. State, 761 So. 2d 269, 277 (Fla. 1999) (per curiam) (citing DeAngelo v.
State, 616 So. 2d 440, 442 (Fla. 1993) (per curiam)).
176. Stacey Wood & Bhushan S. Agharkar, Traumatic Brain Injury in Criminal
Litigation, 84 UMKC L. REV. 411, 419-20 (2015).
177. Lyn M. Gaudet & Gary E. Marchant, Under the Radar:NeuroimagingEvidence in
the Criminal Courtroom, 64 DRAKE L. REV. 577, 626 (2016).
178. Perlin & Lynch, supra note 58, at 354 n.171.
179. Lewis, Death Row Inmates, supra note 151, at 840.
180. Giardino, supra note 47, at 2995.
181. 536 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1988) (per curiam).
182. Id. at 233-34.
183. Mann v. Ryan, 774 F.3d 1203, 1220-22 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated en banc, 828 F. 3d
1143 (9th Cir. 2016).
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accident (the source of the TBI) had an effect on the defendant's
personality, "it hardly changed an altar boy into a callous criminal." 184
Simply put, most cases downplay the significance of TBI as a
potential mitigator in death penalty litigation. By way of example, in
Long v. State,185 the court held that the execution of a prisoner was not
cruel and unusual punishment despite his traumatic brain injury,
stressing that "[n]one of the scientific advances at issue establishes that
traumatic brain injury or temporal lobe epilepsy is the sole cause of
offenses such as those that Long committed against the victim in this
case .... "186
In other cases, the jury chose simply to ignore the evidence. Consider
the astonishing case of Jackson v. State.187 The Jackson court denied
defendant's petition to vacate conviction in a case in which counsel had
called seven mitigation witnesses including a psychologist, the
defendant's probation officer, the defendant's mother, and the
defendant's sister, who was the mother of two of the defendant's
victims.188 All such witnesses testified to the defendant's remorse, anger
disorder, traumatic brain injury, and low I.Q. and gave their opinion that
defendant should be punished but not sentenced to death. 189
Consider also cases involving juveniles. In Miller v. Alabama,190 the
Supreme Court held that mandatory life imprisonment without parole
for those under the age of eighteen at the time of their crimes violates the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. 191
Researchers who studied ninety-four "Miller cases" in North Carolina
noted that juvenile criminal defendants facing life without parole may

rely on "applicable assessments regarding child trauma, sexual and
physical abuse, neurological development, substance abuse, traumatic
brain injury, and other conditions," which would uncover "essential"
information about the presence of TBI.192

184. Mann v. Ryan, 828 F. 3d 1143, 1161 (9th Cir. 2016).
185. 271 So. 3d 938 (Fla. 2019), cert. denied sub norn., Long v. Florida, 139 S. Ct. 2635
(2019).
186. Id. at 943 (emphasis added).
187. 860 So. 2d 653 (Miss. 2003).
188. Id. at 669-70.
189. Id.
190. 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
191. Id. at 469-70.
192. Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, "Some Mother's Child Has Gone Astray":
Neuroscientific Approaches to a Therapeutic JurisprudenceModel of Juvenile Sentencing,
59 FAM. CT. REV. 478, 478 (2021); see also id. at 481 (citing Ben Finholt et al., Juvenile Life
Without Parole in North Carolina, 110 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 141, 147, 154-57, 168
(2020)) (discussing the findings of Finholt and his colleagues).
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iv. Competency to Be Executed
Over a decade ago, in Panetti v. Quarterman, the United States
Supreme Court held that a state may not execute a prisoner "whose
mental illness prevents him from comprehending the reasons for the
penalty or its implications" or is "unaware of the punishment they are
about to suffer and why they are to suffer it."193 Panetti's "severe,
documented mental illness [was] the source of gross delusions preventing
him from comprehending the meaning and purpose of the punishment to
194
which he has been sentenced."
Subsequent courts have not been sympathetic to Panetticlaims made
by defendants with traumatic brain injuries. Thus, in State ex rel.
195
Clayton v. Griffith, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant had a
traumatic brain injury that resulted in the loss of twenty percent of his
frontal lobe, 196 a sharply-split (4-3) state supreme court rejected the
defendant's Panetti argument, concluding that he failed to make a
197
Importantly, the
"threshold showing" that he lacked competence.
Clayton court held that Atkins did not apply to "conditions not recognized
198
as intellectual disabilities under state law."
Most courts have been unresponsive to TBI claims at this juncture of
the proceedings. By way of example, the Florida Supreme Court denied
a death row petitioner's claim that the Eighth Amendment categorically
exempts him from execution because he suffers from severe traumatic
19
brain injury and severe mental illness. 9 Elsewhere, a federal court
found that the defendant did not establish that there is a "'national
193. 551 U.S. 930, 957 (2007). Panetti was grossly psychotic and had been hospitalized
numerous times for serious psychiatric disorders. Id. at 936.
194. Id. at 960. On Panetti, see generally, Michael L. Perlin, "Good and Bad, I Defined
These Terms, Quite Clear No Doubt Somehow": Neuroimaging and Competency to be
Executed After Panetti, 28 BEHAV. SCIs. & L. 671 (2010); PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 92,
§ 17-4.1.6, 17-88-17-96. One of the co-authors (MLP) is working with others on an article
on how two federal circuits (the Fifth and the Ninth) have interpreted (or in many cases,
misinterpreted) Panetti. See Michael L. Perlin et al., "InsanityIs Smashing up Against My
Soul" An Assessment of Competency-to-be-Executed Cases (after Panetti v. Quarterman) in
the Fifth and Ninth Circuits (N.Y. L. Sch. Legal Stud., Research Paper No. 07/08-25, 2008).
195. State ex rel. Clayton v. Griffith, 457 S.W.3d 735 (Mo. 2015).
196. See id. at 754 (Stith, J., dissenting).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 753. See also State ex rel. Barton v. Stange, 597 S.W.3d 661, 663 (Mo. 2020)
(relying on Clayton and rejecting defendant's claim that he was not competent for execution
under Panetti "because a traumatic brain injury gave him major neurocognitive disorder of

sufficient severity that he meets [that] standard.").
199. Long v. State, 271 So.3d 938, 947 (Fla.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2635 (2019). In a
procedural decision, a defendant's claim that he was incompetent to be executed because of
his traumatic braininjury and schizophrenia was not ripe for judicial review, where no date
had been set for his execution. Roberts v. State, 592 S.W.3d 675, 685 (Ark. 2020).
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consensus against executing individuals who are criminally responsible
and competent, even if they suffer from' traumatic brain injury." 200 Thus,
"his motion for a categorical exemption from the death penalty due to
such injury" was deemed to be "meritless."201
There is at least one such case in which the defendant prevailed.
There, in Washington v. State,202 it was determined that the defendant
was incompetent when he was tried and convicted by jury of capital
murder; putting this defendant on trial violated his right to due process,
where the defendant's IQ score of sixty-five satisfied criteria for a formal

diagnosis of an intellectual and developmental disorder, and he was
found to have an intellectual disability "attributable to,
exacerbated by, multiple traumatic brain injuries .... "203

or was

v. The Lisa Montgomery Case
Consider these issues in the context of the Lisa Montgomery case. 204
At the punishment phase, Montgomery's mental health experts testified
that she suffered from a severe mental or emotional disturbance at the
time of her offense, which substantially impaired her ability to appreciate
the wrongfulness of her actions. 205 "The jury unanimously found that the
Government proved all statutory and non-statutory aggravating factors
beyond a reasonable doubt, including that Montgomery committed her
offense in an especially heinous or depraved manner in that the killing
involved serious physical abuse to Stinnett." 2 06
On the question of mitigation, the district court found that Dr. Gur's
proffered testimony was irrelevant to the mitigating factors she had pled,
and thus exercised its authority "to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not
bearing on the defendant's character, prior record, or the circumstances
of [her] offense." 207 The appeals court highlighted the potential

200. United States v. Sampson, No. 01-10384-LTS, 2017 WL 3495703, at *33 (D. Mass.
Aug. 15, 2017) (quoting United States v. Sampson, Cr. No. 01-10384-MLW, 2015 WL
7962394, at *13 (D. Mass. Dec. 2, 2015)).
201. Id. at *33.
202. 584 S.W.3d 929 (Tex. App. 2019).
203. Id. at 930.
204. See Lisa Montgomery, supra note 6.
205. Montgomery v. Barr, No. 4:20-cv-01281-P, 2020 WL 7353711, at *3-4 (N.D. Tex.
Dec. 15, 2020).
206. Id. at *4.
207. United States v. Montgomery, 635 F.3d 1074, 1092-93 (8th Cir. 2011) (alteration
in original) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 n. 12 (1978) (plurality opinion)
(internal quotation marks omitted)). The Eighth Circuit noted that "[u]nder the Federal
Death Penalty Act's low threshold for admissibility, Dr. Gur's interpretation of the PET
scan was arguably admissible." Id. at 1092. Yet "[e]ven if we conclude that the district court
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significance of brain imaging scans, but nevertheless supported the
208
Even though the jury heard mitigation
exclusion from evidence.
experts, as well as from Montgomery's
defense
other
from
testimony
background and psychiatric
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about
psychiatrist
treating
committed had a
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crime
the
that
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presented to the
never
was
conditions
brain-based
her
to
direct link
209
in preventing
evidence
such
of
significance
Thus, the
jury.
210
known.
be
never
will
sentence
death
Montgomery's
In January 2021, Montgomery's attorneys filed a petition for writ of
211
stating that the
habeas corpus and application for stay of execution,
she was not
(as
Amendment
Eighth
the
violate
would
death penalty
not been
had
she
(as
Amendment
Fifth
the
and
competent for execution)
212
petition
The
incompetence).
her
prove
to
opportunity
given the
damaged
was
brain
her
showed
that
imaging
referenced scientific
2 13
Dr. George Woods, an expert in
structurally and functionally.
while on death row, stated
Montgomery
evaluated
who
neuropsychiatry
her ability to have
affected
had
she
that
damage
brain
of
that the kind

erred, we cannot reverse or vacate a federal death sentence on account of an error that is

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 1091.
The citation to Lockett is nothing but bizarre. Lockett has been modified on this
point and its holding has been significantly expanded by Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104, 107-08, 114 (1982) (sentencing authority must consider any relevant mitigating
evidence) and Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 343 (1989) (mitigating evidence relevant to
moral culpability must be admitted). See supra text accompanying notes 154-61.
208. Montgomery, 635 F.3d at 1092 (quoting Purkey, 428 F.3d at 758) ("[A]lthough we
recognize that a jury may be more likely to believe that someone suffers from a problem if
its cause is explained, we nevertheless harbor no doubt that considering the minimal
probative value of the evidence and the overwhelming evidence and jury findings of serious
aggravating factors, its exclusion was harmless.") (alteration in original).
209. Id. at 1091-93 ('The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the MRI
evidence.").
210. See Gaudet & Marchant, supra note 177, at 660-61 (noting that "neuroimaging
data, when used appropriately, can help make evaluations and decisions [regarding
criminal behavior] more informed, fair, and evidence-based.").
211. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Montgomery v. Warden, No. 2:21-cv-00020JPH-DLP (S.D. Ind. Jan. 12, 2021) (No. 21-1052).
212. Id. at 8, 68-69; see also Madison v. Alabama 139 S. Ct. 718, 731 (2019) (finding
the Eighth Amendment did not prohibit executing a state prisoner who had been diagnosed
with vascular dementia merely because he could not remember committing his
crime); Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 958-59 (2007) (concluding that a prisoner
must have a rational understanding of why he's being executed); Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 418 (1986) (barring the execution of an insane defendant,
determining that he was entitled to a competency evaluation and an evidentiary hearing
on this question).
213. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 211, at 47, 51, 62-68.
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accurate perceptions of reality. 214 He concluded: "In my professional
opinion, which I hold to a reasonable degree of psychiatric certainty, Lisa
Montgomery is unable to rationally understand the government's
rationale for her execution as required by Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
399 (1986)." 2 15A stay was granted, 216 but the Supreme Court vacated the
stay of execution without explanation. 2 17 Hours later, Montgomery was
executed. 218
Montgomery's
execution reflects the Trump administration
Department of Justice's disregard for constitutional precedent barring
the execution of persons with a mental illness and persons with an
intellectual disability. 219 Justice Sotomayor echoed that sentiment in her
dissent in Higgs:

214. Id. at 73, 76-77; George Woods, BERKELEY L., https://www.law.berkeley.edu/ourfaculty/faculty-profiles/george-woods/#tabprofile (last visited Dec. 4, 2021).
215. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 211, at 83. Also significant was the
expert opinion on torture and mental illness by Dr. Katherine Porterfield, a clinical
psychologist and leading expert on torture who also evaluated Montgomery while on death
row. Id. at 69. Dr. Porterfield concluded:
Mrs. Montgomery[ ]is currently unable to rationally understand the basis for her
execution. My opinion is also based on my knowledge and experience as a
psychologist who has worked with survivors of torture and other trauma for more
than two decades, and the United States Supreme Court opinion in Madison v.
Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 718 (2019).
Id. at 69.
216. Montgomery v. Barr, No. 20-cv-3261, 2020 WL 6799140, at *11 (D.D.C. Nov. 19,
2020) (granting preliminary injunction on clemency claim). On November 19, the district
court granted petitioner's motion in part, explaining that it would "stay Plaintiff's
execution-briefly-to permit [her attorneys] to recover from [COVID-19] and to have a
short time to finish their work in supplementing Plaintiff's placeholder petition for a
reprieve or commutation of sentence." Id. at *10; see also Brief for Respondent at 8,
Montgomery v. Rosen, 141 S. Ct. 1144 (2021) (No. 20-922).
217. See Rosen v. Montgomery, 141 S. Ct. 1232, 1232 (2021) (mem.); see also Montgomery
v. Rosen, No. 21-5001, 2021 WL 112524, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 11, 2021) (en banc); United
States v. Higgs, 141 S. Ct. 645, 649 (2021) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Higgs was the final
federal death row inmate executed during the Trump administration. See Elizabeth
Bruenig, The Government Has Not Explained How These Thirteen People Were Selected to
Die, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/18/opinion/federaldeath-penalty.html?campaignid=39&emc=edit ty 20210218&instanceid=27238&nl=
opinion-today&regiid=57026281&segmentid=51882&te=1&userid=2a04dec6acO7e
810f6b2a92435b2c1fe (noting that during President Biden's campaign, he promised to
"work to pass legislation to eliminate the death penalty at the federal level, and incentivize
states to follow the federal government's example").
218. See Higgs, 141 S. Ct. at 649.
219. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), discussed supratext accompanying
notes 153-54; see also Perlin et al., supra note 154; see generally Michael L. Perlin, 'Life Is
in Mirrors, Death Disappears"Giving Life to Atkins, 33 N. MEX. L. REV. 315 (2003).
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made a "substantial threshold
Lisa Montgomery likewise
that she was incompetent to be
Court
District
the
to
showing"
evidence that Montgomery was
expert
on
Based
executed....

experiencing a dissociative psychotic state, the District Court
concluded that her "current mental state is so divorced from
reality that she cannot rationally understand the government's
rationale for her execution." . . . These findings . . . raised
significant questions as to whether their executions comported
with the Constitution. We will never have definitive answers to
those questions because this Court sanctioned their executions
anyway.22o

Before leaving office, President Trump ramped up federal executions, breaking with a 130year-old precedent of pausing executions amid a presidential transition. Holly Honderich,
Executions, BBC NEWS (Jan. 16, 2021),
In Trump's Final Days, a Rush of Federal
55 236 26 0
; see also Higgs, 141 S. Ct. at 647
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canadaa single federal execution, the
without
years
seventeen
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("After
Government has executed twelve people since July. They are Daniel Lee, Wesley Purkey,
Dustin Honken, Lezmond Mitchell, Keith Nelson, William LeCroy Jr., Christopher Vialva,
Orlando Hall, Brandon Bernard, Alfred Bourgeois, Lisa Montgomery, and, just last night,
Corey Johnson. Today, Dustin Higgs will become the thirteenth. To put that in historical
context, the Federal Government will have executed more than three times as many people
in the last six months than it had in the previous six decades.").
220. Higgs, 141 S. Ct. at 651-52. Justice Sotomayor also discussed two other
contemporaneous executions: 1) that of Alfred Bourgeois, who was put to death on
December 11, 2020, after an earlier execution date was stayed by a federal judge due to
evidence that showed he had an intellectual disability; and 2) that of Corey Johnson, who
was executed on January 14, 2021, after his legal team argued that he suffered from an
intellectual disability related to physical and emotional abuse he experienced as a child. Id.
at 649; Michael Tarm, US Executes Louisiana Truck Driver Who Killed Daughter, 2, AP
NEWS (Dec. 11, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-us-news-executions-terre-

62 3
b; Danielle Haynes & Darryl Coote, U.S.
haute-indiana-32f7e296aba11d7d749bb996cffe
Executes Corey Johnson for 1992 Murders, UPI (Jan. 15, 2021, 1:26 AM),
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2021/01/14/US-executes-Corey-Johnson-for-1992murders/1541610648701/.
Relying on the terms of the Federal Death Penalty Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c), Justice
Sotomayor noted that "[a] sentence of death shall not be carried out upon a person who is
[intellectually disabled] [and that both] Alfred Bourgeois and Corey Johnson presented
substantial evidence that they were intellectually disabled under modern diagnostic
standards." Higgs, 141 S. Ct. at 649 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). She reiterated the question
of whether Montgomery's execution and others comported with the Constitution, given that
"the district courts concluded they were likely to succeed in showing that they had no
'rational understanding' of why the State want[ed] to execute [them]." Id. at 651. The

answer, Justice Sotomayor concluded, was forever lost due to the Court's sanction of the

executions. Id. at 652.
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vi. Conclusion

In short, TBI has great potential relevance to all three of the major
death penalty questions addressed here (dangerousness, mitigation, and
competency to be executed), a relevance reflected startlingly clearly in
the case of Lisa Montgomery. Although TBI is occasionally considered
carefully, 221 at this point in time, the majority of courts have not taken it
remotely seriously enough. The hiding-in-plain-view issue to which we
must turn next is the extent to which counsel "gets" the importance of

these issues.222

III. ADEQUACY OF COUNSEL

No matter which substantive aspect of criminal procedure/law we
look at, there is one constant: the adequacy/effectiveness of counsel is
globally the single most important issue to consider. 223
The burden to assure a fair trial "must be placed on the advocate and,
particularly, on defense counsel." 224 The Supreme Court's standard in
Strickland v. Washington225 governs the question of adequacy of counsel
in criminal trials. 226 "In its Sixth Amendment analysis, the Court
acknowledged that simply assigning a lawyer to a defendant is not
constitutionally adequate per se; rather, that lawyer must provide

'effective assistance of counsel,' requiring simply that counsel's efforts be
'reasonable' under the circumstances." 227 The benchmark for judging an

221. For rare examples, see Georgia Dep't of Human Resources v. Drust, 448 S.E.2d 364
(Ga. 1994) (incompetency), discussed supra in text accompanying notes 86-91; Washington
v. State, 584 S.W.3d 929 (Tex. App. 2019) (incompetency; defendant had been tried for
capital murder but was sentenced to life without parole), discussed supra text
accompanying notes 203-04; and Ward v. Sternes, 209 F. Supp. 2d 950 (C.D. Ill. 2002)
(defendant's right to testify; defendant had been sentenced to a 40 year term in prison),
discussed supra in text accompanying notes 79-80.
222. See infra Section III.
223. See Michael L. Perlin, Talia R. Harmon & Sarah Chatt, "A World of SteelEyedDeath" An Empirical Evaluationof the Failure of the Strickland Standard to Ensure
Adequate Counsel to Defendants with Mental DisabilitiesFacing the Death Penalty, 53 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 261, 265 (2019); see also MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY AND
THE DEATH PENALTY: THE SHAME OF THE STATES 123-38 (2013).

224. Michael L. Perlin & Heather Ellis Cucolo, "Something's HappeningHere/But You
Don't Know What It Is" How Jurors (Mis)ConstrueAutism in the Criminal Trial Process,
82 U. PITT. L. REV. 585, 597 (2021).
225. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
226. See id. at 687-88.
227. Perlin & Cucolo, supra note 224, at 597; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 ("[A]
court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range
of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the
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ineffectiveness claim is simply "whether counsel's conduct so undermined
the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be
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elements of each case-skills that are most likely beyond most attorneys'

230
schooling and legal education." At the very least, counsel in cases with
issues of TBI "must demonstrate a familiarity with both the clinical
231
diagnosis and the societal perceptions" of such persons.
In a recent article, one of the co-authors (MLP) and two other
colleagues looked at all Fifth Circuit cases involving defendants with
mental disabilities sentenced to death and concluded:

The story of how the Fifth Circuit has dealt with Strickland
appeals in cases involving defendants with mental disabilities
facing the death penalty is bizarre and frightening. In virtually
all cases, Strickland errors-often egregious errors-were
ignored, and in over a third of the cases in which they were
232
acknowledged, defense counsel had confessed error.
Importantly, Strickland is merely the constitutional standard;
however, the ethical rules that govern attorney conduct do not seem to
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered
sound trial strategy."') (citation omitted).
228. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. One of us (MLP) critiques this standard extensively in
PERLIN, supra note 223, at 123-38. On how this standard is "pallid," see, for example,
Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, 'Tar from the Turbulent Space": Consideringthe
Adequacy of Counsel in the Representationof Individuals Accused of Being Sexually Violent
Predators,18 U. PA. J.L. & Soc. CHANGE 125 at 132 (2015).
229. Perlin & Cucolo, supra note 224, at 598 (quoting Cucolo & Perlin, supra note 228,
at 158).
230. Id.
231. Id. (discussing the parallel misperceptions in cases involving defendants with
Autism Spectrum Disorder); see John Blume & Pamela Blume Leonard, Capital Cases,
CHAMPION 63 (Nov. 2000) ("[D]efense counsel must understand the wide range of mental
health issues relevant to criminal cases, recognize and identify the multitude of symptoms

that may be exhibited by our clients, and be familiar with how mental health experts arrive
at diagnoses and determine how the client's mental illness influenced his behavior at the
time of the offense.").
232. Perlin, Harmon & Chatt, supra note 223, at 308; "Regularly, this Court affirmed
convictions (in multiple cases leading to sanctioned executions) in cases where counsel

introduced no mitigating evidence, failed to retain mental health experts, and failed to read
mental health records. In the aggregate, the Fifth Circuit regularly and consistently
mocked the idea of adequate and effective counsel." Id.
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fare much better in holding attorneys to a high standard of legal

representation.

233

The American Bar Association ("ABA") is the main body responsible
for monitoring the legal community. 234 This oversight of organizational
ethics and the concomitant policing within the legal profession critically
assures that attorneys remain diligent in their duties and
responsibilities. 235 Thus, the ABA and state bar associations have
promulgated ethical rules to standardize attorney behavior and define an
attorney's duties to her clients. 236
Under Strickland, "breach of an ethical standard does not necessarily
make out a denial of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance of
counsel." 237 The burden to prevail on a Strickland claim is high because
"[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential,"
and because "a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance." 238 The objectively reasonablestandard of Strickland looks to
"prevailing professional norms." 239 With regard to criminal practice, the
ABA did promulgate standards specifically for criminal defense
attorneys: the Criminal Justice Standards for the Defense Function
("Standards"). 240 These Standards "describe 'best practices,' and are not
intended to serve as the basis for the imposition of professional discipline,

to create substantive or procedural rights for clients, or to create a
233. See generally Heather Ellis Cucolo, The Culpability of Legal Ethics in Failing to
Bolster the Shortcomings of Strickland v. Washington, in JUSTICE OUTSOURCED: THE
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE IMPLICATIONS OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING BY NON-

JUDICIAL OFFICERS (Michael L. Perlin & Kelly Frailing eds. forthcoming 2021) (manuscript
in progress).

234. About Us, AM. BAR ASS'N, https://www.americanbar.org/about theaba/ (last
visited Dec. 4, 2021). On the ABA's role in capital cases, see Celestine Richards McConville,
Protecting the Right to Effective Assistance of Capital Postconviction Counsel: The Scope of
the ConstitutionalObligationto Monitor Counsel Performance, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 521, 52728 (2005).
235. See Warren E. Burger, The Decline of Professionalism, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 949,
956-57 (1995).
236. About Us, supra note 234. For further information regarding state bar associations,
see STATE BAR ASS'NS, http://www.statebarassociations.org/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2021).
Although each state is free to adopt their own code of professional conduct, almost all states
have chosen to incorporate the ABA version. Only California has not adopted the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. See Alphabetical List of JurisdictionsAdopting Model Rules,
AM.
BAR
ASS'N
(Mar.
28,
2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional responsibility/publications/model_rules
.of professionalconduct/alphalist_stateadoptingmodelrules.html.
237. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165 (1986).
238. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 669, 689 (1984).
239. Id. at 688.
240.

AM. BAR ASS'N, CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE DEF. FUNCTION (2017).
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The Strickland Court referenced the
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Standards as reflecting "[p]revailing norms of practice[,]" but emphasized
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that they are only guides in a determination of what is reasonable.
Courts continue to use and cite the Standards in determining
243
Although,
whether defense counsel has provided effective assistance.
Model
the
under
accountable
the procedure to hold lawyers
in
procedure
the
from
different
Rules/Standards can be drastically
244
a
at
proof
of
standard
the
states,
some
in
Strickland. For instance,
the
Arizona
in
example,
of
way
By
higher.
disciplinary hearing may be
defendant must establish that a constitutional defect has occurred by a
preponderance of the evidence; at that point, the state has the burden of
245
But
proving that the defect was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
establish
to
counsel
bar
require
discipline
Arizona's grounds for
246
Thus, if a defendant is
allegations by clear and convincing evidence.
ineffective assistance
Strickland
a
on
burden
unsuccessful in meeting her
meet the burden of
to
unable
be
likely
of counsel claim, she will most
norms of
"prevailing
the
below
fell
conduct
showing that her attorney's
247
Standards.
and
Rules
Model
the
practice" as defined within
Of course, questions of adequacy of counsel must be considered in the
context of those factors that contaminate all of criminal law/mental
2
disability law practice: 48

241. Id. § 4-1.1(b).
242. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
243. See Martin Marcus, The Making of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards-Forty
Years of Excellence, CRIM. JUST. 10, 14 (Winter 2009).
244. See AM. BAR AsS'N, CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE DEF. FUNCTION (2017);
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
245. ARiz. R. CRIM. P. 33.13(c).
246. In re Wolfram, 847 P.2d 94, 98 n.4 (Ariz. 1993).
247. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165 (1986). But see In re Warren, 321 F. App'x 369,
370 (5th Cir. 2009) (sanctions issued after relief granted on ineffective assistance of counsel
grounds).
248. See Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 3, at 79-80.
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*

The ways that sanism 249 and pretextuality2 5 o permeate the

legal process;
*

The ways that fact-finders (often unconsciously) rely on
heuristic reasoning 251 and (false) "ordinary common sense" in
their fact-finding (both judges and jurors), 252 and

249. See Perlin, Harmon & Chatt, supra note 223, at 279 (footnotes omitted) ("Sanism
dominates the entire representational process in cases involving individuals with mental
disabilities, and it reflects what civil rights lawyer Florynce Kennedy has characterized as
the 'pathology of oppression.' It is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character
of other irrational prejudices that cause (and are reflected in) racism, sexism, homophobia,
and ethnic bigotry. Sanism is 'largely invisible and largely socially acceptable.' It 'infects
both our jurisprudence and our lawyering practices . .. [and is] based predominantly upon
stereotype, myth, superstition, and deindividualization,' in 'unconscious response to events
both in everyday life and in the legal process.' Its 'corrosive effects have warped all aspects
of the criminal process."').
250. See id. at 280 (footnotes omitted) ("Pretextuality describes the ways in which courts
accept testimonial dishonesty-especially by expert witnesses-and engage similarly in
dishonest (and frequently meretricious) decision-making. This phenomenon is 'especially
poisonous where courts accept witness testimony that shows a "high propensity to
purposely distort their testimony in order to achieve desired ends."' It 'breeds cynicism and
disrespect for the law, demeans participants, and reinforces shoddy lawyering, blasb
judging, and, at times, perjurious and/or corrupt testifying."').
251. Heuristics refers to a cognitive psychology construct that describes the implicit
thinking devices that individuals use to simplify complex, information-processing tasks.
Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, "They're Planting Stories in the Press": The
Impact of Media Distortionson Sex Offender Law and Policy, 3 U. DENV. CRIM. L. REV. 185,
212 (2013). The use of such heuristics frequently leads to distorted and systematically
erroneous decisions, and it leads decision-makers to ignore or misuse items of rationally
useful information. Id. Judges thus focus on information that confirms their preconceptions
(i.e., confirmation bias), to recall vivid and emotionally charged aspects of cases (i.e., the
availability heuristic), and to interpret information that reinforces the status quo as
legitimate (i.e., system justification biases). Eden B. King, Discrimination in the 21st
Century: Are Science and the Law Aligned?, 17 PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y & L. 54, 58 (2011); see
also John T. Jost & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Role of Stereotyping in System-Justification
and the Productionof FalseConsciousness, 33 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCH. 1 (1994); Amos Tversky
& Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5
COGNITIVE PSYCH. 207 (1973). Especially pernicious is the "vividness" heuristic, through
which "one single vivid, memorable case overwhelms mountains of abstract, colorless data
upon which rational choices should be made." Perlin, Borderline, supra note 97, at 1417.
The use of these heuristics blinds us "to the 'gray areas' of human behavior." Michael L.
Perlin, "She Breaks Just Like a Little Girl: Neonaticide, the Insanity Defense, and the
Irrelevanceof "OrdinaryCommon Sense," 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 27 (2003); see
generally Perlin, Harmon & Chatt, supranote 223, at 280-81.
252. OCS is a powerful unconscious animator of legal decision making that reflects
idiosyncratic, reactive decision-making, and is a psychological construct that reflects the
level of the disparity between perception and reality that regularly pervades the judiciary
in deciding cases involving individuals with mental disabilities. See Richard K. Sherwin,
Dialects and Dominance:A Study of Rhetorical Fields in the Law of Confessions, 136 U. PA.
L. REV. 729, 737-38 (1988) (OCS exemplified by the attitude of "What I know is 'self
evident'; it is 'what everybody knows."'); Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics and the
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The frequent failure of counsel to grasp the textures of all
aspects of the forensic mental health process (competency,
insanity, involuntary medication issues, sentencing, the
253
death penalty).

Strickland has been raised in over 20 reported cases involving
defendants with TBI, but it has rarely been found to require reversal or
remand. In one case, the court found that, even if a TBI was present, the
defendant did not demonstrate that it "affected his cases[,]" thus
25 4
reflecting a lack of prejudice under Strickland. In another case, the
court found that trial counsel's decision to forgo a diminished mental
capacity defense (where, in a report to counsel an expert had concluded
that, because of TBI, the defendant "'was unable to inhibit his impulses,
appreciate the criminality of his actions and conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law"' at the time of the crime) was not based upon an
inadequate investigation and was not unreasonable under the
255
circumstances.
Other cases similarly ignore the Strickland mandate. Thus, where
the defendant alleged that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise
concerns to the court during the change of plea hearing about the
defendant's mental state or history of traumatic brain injury, that claim
failed because the defendant offered no evidence to suggest that, had he
more fully understood the waiver, he would have decided not to enter the
guilty plea or, alternatively, that he could have negotiated different
terms. 256 And, counsel's failure to raise the defendant's alleged inability
and incompetence to waive his Miranda rights during police transport
Insanity Defense: "OrdinaryCommon Sense" and Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NEB. L. REV. 3,
21, 29 (1990).
OCS presupposes two "self-evident" truths: first, everyone knows how to assess an
individual's behavior; and second, everyone knows when to blame someone for doing wrong.
Michael L. Perlin, Myths, Realities, and the Political World: The Anthropology of Insanity
Defense Attitudes, 24 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5, 17 (1996). OCS is self-referential
and non-reflective; "I see it that way, therefore everyone sees it that way; I see it that way,
therefore that's the way it is." Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 3, at 88. OCS is supported by
our reliance on a series of heuristics-cognitive-simplifying devices that distort our abilities
to rationally consider information. Michael L. Perlin & Heather Ellis Cucolo, "Tollingfor
the Aching Ones Whose Wounds Cannot Be Nursed": The Marginalization of Racial
Minorities and Women in Institutional Mental DisabilityLaw, 20 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST.
431, 453 (2017); see generally Perlin & Cucolo, supra note 224, at 606-09 (discussing OCS).
253. See, e.g., PERLIN, supra note 223, at 123-38.
254. Soto v. Ryan, No. CV-14-02562, 2015 WL 10761165, at *8 (D. Ariz. Dec. 24, 2015).
255. Morgan v. Joyner, No. 1:09cv416, 2016 WL 4703977, at *8 (W.D.N.C. Sep. 7, 2016).
256. United States v. Fields, No. 08-CR-11-TLS, 2013 WL 1410231, at *7 (N.D. Ind. Apr.
8, 2013).
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due

to the

defendant's

brain injury

did

not constitute

deficient

performance. 25 7
Perhaps the most jaw-dropping case of this cohort is Elmore v.
Sinclair,258 where the astonishing facts detail that:
Counsel not only failed to undertake any brain damage
investigation, but offered no explanation for this omission other
than inexperience. 25 9 Counsel had never represented a death
penalty defendant prior to Elmore, and he had never retained a
neuropsychologist or neurologist in his previous criminal defense
work. He testified that "unless identification of signs or
symptoms of traumatic brain injury were covered" in one of the
death penalty seminars that he attended, "he did not recall ever
having received such training." 260
In one case where a federal appellate court panel had found a

Strickland violation, in a case where it had made a finding of fact that
"undisputed brain damage resulting from a traumatic brain injury is
inherently mitigating[,]" and that failure to present this to the trial court
violated Strickland,26 1 the en banc court reversed and reinstated the
defendant's death penalty sentence, finding that the defendant failed to
demonstrate prejudice under Strickland.2 2 But perhaps the most
stupefying case of all in this context is Ansteensen v. Davis, as discussed
previously, 263 in which trial counsel had told defendant that "a plea of
not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) based on his traumatic brain
2
injury was 'not allowed by law."' 64

257. Commonwealth v. Watkins, 108 A.3d 652, 676 (Pa. 2014). See, for example,
McMillan v. State, 258 So. 3d 1154, 1177 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017), where defense counsel
was found to not be ineffective for failing to investigate capital murder defendant's alleged
neurological disorders of fetal alcohol syndrome and traumatic brain injury; defendant had
not pled in either his original post-conviction petition or his amended petition that he
actually suffered from fetal alcohol syndrome or that he had been diagnosed with traumatic
brain injury.

258. Elmore v. Sinclair, 799 F.3d 1238 (9th Cir. 2015).
259. Id. at 1255.
260. Id. at 1255, n.2 (Hurwitz, C.J., concurring).
261. Evans v. Sec'y, Dept. of Corrs., 681 F.3d 1241, 1269 (11th Cir. 2012).
262. Evans v. Sec'y, Dept. of Corrs., 703 F.3d 1316, 1327 (11th Cir. 2013) (en banc); see
generally Deborah W. Denno, How Prosecutorsand Defense Attorneys Differ in Their Use of
Neuroscience Evidence, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 464-65 (2016) (discussing both decisions
in Evans).

263. See supra text accompanying notes 101-102.
264. Ansteensen v. Davis, No. 11-CV-01099-BNB, 2011 WL 6153107, at *2 (D. Colo. Dec.
9, 2011).
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The case of Lisa Montgomery is a further example of the dangers of
inadequacy of counsel for persons with mental illness and TBI. It is also
a further example of how difficult it is for a defendant to succeed on any
265
Montgomery's motion to vacate, set aside, or
ineffectiveness claim.
she asserted a variety of complaints about
which
in
sentence
her
correct
2
was continuously denied. 66
counsel
trial
her
the performance of
At trial, Montgomery was represented by Frederick Duchardt, a
26 7
Duchardt's track record was outlined in a recent
Kansas City attorney.
26
s
article:

265. See Phyllis L. Crocker, Childhood Abuse and Adult Murder: Implications for the
Death Penalty, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1143, 1221-22 (1999). The Strickland test has been
extensively criticized, especially as it is applied in death penalty cases. See, e.g., William S.
Geimer, A Decade of Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical Undermining of the
Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91, 92-160 (1995) (Strickland has corrupted
not only the evaluation of counsel's performance but also other components of the criminal
justice system such as the harmless error doctrine and ethical standards governing
attorney conduct); Ellen Kreitzberg, Death Without Justice, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 485,
499-506, 486 (1995) (Strickland is largely to blame for the failure of the criminal justice
system to ensure that the death penalty is constitutionally applied because Strickland
ignored "the special nature of capital cases . .. and hindered the assurance of effective legal
representation"); Ivan K. Fong, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Capital Sentencing, 39
STAN L. REV. 461, 463 (1987) (Strickland does not ensure effective assistance of counsel to
defendants at the punishment phase of death penalty cases); Note, The Eighth Amendment
and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Trials, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1923, 1930-33
(1994) (Strickland imposes too high a standard).This Part builds on these criticisms by
examining how the test for ineffective assistance of counsel interfaces with one aspect of a
death penalty case-the failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence of childhood
abuse.
266. The district court denied relief, the Eighth Circuit denied a Certificate of
Appealability (Order, Montgomery, No. 17-1716), and the Supreme Court denied
Montgomery's petition for writ of certiorari. Montgomery v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 2820,
2820 (2020). The potential application of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) was
not raised until 2015 in a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255. See Montgomery v. United States, No. 05-06002-CR-SJ-GAF, 2015 WL
13893079, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 21, 2015). The Strickland claim was rejected, "Movant was
not denied effective assistance of counsel . . . nor was the attorney/client relationship
unconstitutionally interfered with. Movant has failed to establish that a fraud on the Court
occurred or that conflicts of interest denied her effective assistance of counsel." Id. at *32.
In addition, even though at trial the government's experts described Montgomery as being
a willing participant in the rapes by her stepfather which the prosecution referenced in
closing, the district court held that "there was no prosecutorial misconduct or errors in the
Government's closing argument which would support relief." Id.
267. See Montgomery v. United States, No. 05-06002-CR-SJ-GAF, 2015 WL 13893079,
at *3 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 21, 2015) (Montgomery's original attorneys stated they could not work
together in her interest and requested to withdraw from the case. On May 12, 2006, Judge
Maughmer granted the motion to withdraw and appointed Duchardt).
268. David Rose, Death Row, The Lawyer Who Keeps Losing, GUARDIAN (Nov. 24, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/24/death-row-the-lawyer-who-keeps-losing.
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Out of seven federal death trials, four of Duchardt's clients have
received the death penalty, two have been handed life sentences
and one has been acquitted after an appeal and a retrial. This
tally means that Duchardt has had more clients sentenced to
death in federal court than any other defen[s]e lawyer in
America. 26 9

According to David Rose, Duchardt visited Montgomery three times
prior to her trial. 270 Due to Montgomery's distrust of men, Duchardt
instead sent his wife, who "had no experience of investigating death
penalty cases[,]" "to visit her in prison another 16 times." 271 On appeal it
was discovered that "before her trial, neither the prosecution nor the
defen[s]e had investigated the relationship between Montgomery's many
symptoms and her appalling history. She had seemed to the jury
impassive and unemotional, as if she bore no remorse. In fact, this was
the result of powerful antipsychotic medication." 272

269. Id. Duchardt also represented Wesley Purkey who was executed by the federal
government along with Montgomery. Id.; see also Tigran W. Eldred, Motivation Matters:
Guideline 10.13 and Other Mechanisms for Preventing Lawyers from Surrenderingto SelfInterest in Responding to Allegations of Ineffective Assistance in Death Penalty Cases, 42
HOFSTRA L. REV. 473, 473-74, 477 (2013) (discussing ineffective assistance of counsel in the
Purkey case).

270. Rose, supra note 268; see also Molly J. Walker Wilson, Defense Attorney Bias and
the Rush to the Plea, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 271, 305 n.179 (2016) (discussing Perisha Wallace,
No Equal Justice for the Poor: Mississippi's Failed Attempt to Honor Right to Counsel
Mandates, 9 S.J. POL'Y & JUST. 81, 87 (2015) (providing the example of a defendant who
remained in jail for over eleven months without receiving a single visit from a lawyer).
271. Rose, supra note 268. Duchardt's wife had no experience of investigating death
penalty cases. Id. Her recent expertise was in horse therapy for autistic children. Id.
272. Rose, supra note 268. On the interplay between juror perception of remorse and the
administration of antipsychotic medication to defendants facing the death penalty, see
Perlin, Merchants, supra note 160, at 1530-31, discussing Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127,
144 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring), and the research reported in Geimer & Amsterdam,
supra note 160.
On Duchardt's work in the Montgomery case, the author stated,
Duchardt responded to Montgomery's appeal with an affidavit of more than 100
pages defending his conduct, insisting that "none of the issues raised" by her appeal
lawyers "has merit". He added: "I have tried and prepared more than a dozen
capital cases, and I have addressed complex mental health issues in many . . . My
guess is that my credentials stack up as well as any capital case attorney or
'mitigation specialist' to be found. I know that my credentials are as good or better
than those who have been relied upon as experts by Current Counsel for
Ms[.] Montgomery."
Rose, supranote 268.
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Duchardt's initial plan was to claim that Lisa's brother committed
the murder and afterwards gave Lisa the baby. That strategy was
273
abandoned once it was discovered that Lisa's brother had an alibi.
Montgomery's appellate attorney, federal public defender Kelley Henry,
explained in an interview with Rolling Stone magazine how Duchardt
misunderstood and misinterpreted the information gathered from Lisa:
Lisa had described feeling as if another person was with her.
That was a symptom. She was describing something called
depersonalization - a symptom of trauma, and you feel like
you're outside yourself. She was giving them a symptom. And
they decided that that symptom was truth. And then that was
274
the mistake they just kept making with Lisa.
Duchardt's ultimate strategy at trial was not successful. He admitted
that although his client was the killer, she was not guilty by reason of
insanity because, he believed, she had been suffering from a phantom
pregnancy, or pseudocyesis. Any defense proffered evidence supporting
pseudocyesis was successfully excluded on the grounds that it had no
275
scientific basis. Not only did Duchardt fail to secure the introduction of
expert testimony on his defense claim of insanity, he was ineffective in
276
David Kidwell Sr., Montgomery's
using other witness testimony.
to offer that Montgomery had
testimony
had
sheriff,
cousin and a deputy
that her stepfather and his
him
telling
teenager,
a
as
him
in
"confided
277
But
on her afterward."
urinated
and
her,
beat
her,
raped
friends
278
trial.
at
testimony
mitigating
potentially
that
offered
never
Duchardt
The question of whether Duchardt's decision was strategic or due to a
lack of diligence and competency was seemingly answered by
Montgomery's appellate attorney's investigation into the case. In fact,
when Kelley Henry took over the appellate case, she initially considered
David Kidwell Sr.'s testimony from the original trial to be weak until she
herself actually spoke with him:
[W]e interviewed him at a truck stop in Topeka, Kansas. And I
mean, my jaw dropped to the floor. I couldn't believe what he told
us that Lisa had told him when she was 14 years old about these

273. See Murphy, supranote 173.
274. See id. (discussing Duchardt's litigation strategies with Montgomery's capital
appellate attorney, Kelley Henry).
275. See Rose, supra note 268.
276. See Murphy, supra note 173.
277. Id.
278. See id.
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gang rapes. And he was on the witness stand! And in his
declaration, he told me, "It took me longer to take the oath than
to give my testimony. I couldn't believe they didn't ask me any of
these questions." He thought they were gonna ask, and he was
ready to get to give that testimony. They never asked him. 279
As one article points out, "[t]he evidence that Lisa Montgomery was
a victim as much as a perpetrator should have been overwhelming." 280
IV. ROLE OF EXPERTS

A.

Introduction

We have previously considered the issue of expert testimony as
directly related to the outcome of the Lisa Montgomery case, but to
seriously consider cases in which persons with mental, intellectual, or
neurological disabilities are at risk, we must take a deeper look into the
use of experts in TBI cases. In each case involving defendants with TBI,
these are questions that must be addressed:
"

Has the
dictates
Dunn282
indigent

"

Have the details and intricacies of what "traumatic brain
injury" actually means been explained to the fact-finder by
the expert, and have stereotypes based on false "ordinary
common sense"283 been rebutted?

trial court authentically complied with the
of Ake v. Oklahoma2 i and McWilliams v.
in providing appropriate expert assistance to
persons with such disabilities?

279. Id.
280. Rose, supra note 268. While being questioned by Montgomery's appellate attorney,
it was suggested that Duchardt,

"didn'tlike mitigation specialists", [but] he denied this, saying: "I don't know where
this comes from." He refused to accept that pursuing the pseudocyesis line had
been an error. As for the evidence of Montgomery's appalling background, in
Duchardt's view, much of the research into this by other lawyers was "garbage".
Id.; see
281.
282.
283.

also supra text accompanying notes 172-73.
470 U.S. 68 (1985).
137 S. Ct. 1790 (2017).
See supranote 253.
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There is a stunning disconnect between the false "ordinary common
sense" of fact-finders (both jurors and judges) and the valid and reliable
scientific evidence that should inform decisions on the full range of
questions that are raised in cases involving the forensic mental health
systems-predictions of future dangerousness, competency and insanity
determinations, sentencing mitigation in death penalty cases, and
284
This gains in significance
sexually violent predator commitments.
because:
1.

All of these disconnects are heightened in cases involving
defendants with TBI.

2.

Abetted by the misuse of "heuristic" reasoning ("the vividness
285
decisionmakers in
effect," "confirmatory bias," and more),
that poison the
ways
in
wrong"
it
"get
frequently
such cases
system.
justice
criminal

3.

Absent the presence of objective diagnostic imaging, lay and
expert witnesses may provide the foundation to demonstrate
an alteration of consciousness to prove traumatic brain
injury. 286 Whereas "[l]ay witnesses are key to describe and
confirm the TBI victim's before-and-after behavior and
function[,]" 287 the most important aspect of a criminal
prosecution involving TBI likely will be the expert medical
testimony.

One key question that must be considered is this: will such expert
288
testimony be made available to the defendant? In Ake v. Oklahoma,
the Court concluded that a "criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if the
State proceeds against an indigent defendant without making certain
that he has access to the raw materials integral to the building of an

284. See, e.g., Perlin et al., supra note 224, at 284 (citing in part Ellen Byers, Mentally
Ill Criminal Offenders and the Strict Liability Effect: Is There Hope for a Just Jurisprudence
in an Era of Responsibility/ConsequencesTalk?, 57 ARK. L. REV. 447, 499 n.336 (2004))
("[J]urors self-reflectively reject consideration of the sort of scientific evidence that must be
relied on in efforts to demonstrate mental impairment as a basis for mitigation, as such
evidence may be 'beyond the understanding of jurors who rely on ordinary common sense
in decision-making.'").
285. See Perlin, Deceived Me, supra note 145, at 88.
286. Daniel S. Chamberlain, Tacking the Concussion Case, TRIAL, Aug. 2016, at 26, 30.
287. Id.
288. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
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effective defense." 289 Subsequently, in McWilliams v. Dunn,290 the Court
built on Ake, holding that the defendant had the right to an expert to
"translate these data [medical records, other doctors' reports] into a legal
strategy ... ."291 What is remarkable is the utter lack of caselaw on this
precise question. 292
B.

Need for Multiple Experts

Elsewhere, one of the authors (MLP) has proposed that we must
provide two experts in cases in which inaccuracy is likely (based often on
improper reliance on heuristics), one to explain to the fact-finders why
their "common sense" is fatally flawed, and one to provide an evaluation
of the defendant in the context of the specific question before the court. 293
The reality is that the public-this includes judges as well as jurors along
with those whose knowledge base flows from TV news and Internet
websites-is dead wrong about everything it thinks it knows about all of
the issues that arise in cases involving defendants with TBI.294
Only the use of multiple experts can remediate this situation. 295 A
second expert could explain the roots of this disordered thought (on the
part of the fact-finders), demonstrate to jurors how sanist pretexts

dominate their thought processes, and illuminate why reliance on
heuristics and false "ordinary common sense" is inappropriate in these
cases, as they "distort our abilities to rationally consider information." 296
Without the sort of extra witness urged here, it is impossible for the fact
finder to actually make a "sensible and educated determination" 297 about

the case in question. As two of the co-authors (MLP & AJL) have written:
"Scientific discovery moves faster than the law, and it is critical to make
sure that the legal system is given an opportunity to catch up, rather
289. Id. at 77.
290. 137 S. Ct. 1790 (2017).
291. Id. at 1800. It should be noted that McWilliams had suffered a traumatic brain
injury as a child. See Louise Root, Comment, The Key to Any Successful Relationship Is
Communication: Lawyers and Doctors, Take Note, 57 HOUSTON L. REv. 1135, 1153 (2020).
292. See Elmore v. Shoop, No. 1:07-CV-776, 2019 WL 1076858, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 7,
2019) (finding a prejudicial Ake violation where counsel failed to obtain the funds for, and
secure the administration of, PET brain scan to adequately prepare defense case), overruled
in part on other grounds sub nom by Elmore v. Warden, Chillicothe Corr. Inst., No. 1:07-cv775, 2019 WL 5704042 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 5, 2019).
293. See Perlin, Deceived Me, supra note 145, at 105-06.
294. Sarah Britto & Krystal E. Noga-Styron, Media Consumption and Support for
CapitalPunishment, 39 CRIM. JUST. REv. 81, 94-96 (2014).
295. See Perlin, Deceived Me, supra note 145, at 105-06.
296. Id. For more on how these stereotypes are conflated with stereotypes of race,
gender, and ethnicity, see Perlin & Cucolo, supra note 224, at 453.
297. As mandated by Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985).
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than risk allowing 'junk science' to influence how a defendant is

treated."298

2
The caselaw is, to be charitable, sparse. In State v. Woodbury, 99 a
registered nurse was qualified to testify as an expert regarding behavior
of the defendant, who had a traumatic brain injury, at trial for driving
under the influence of intoxicants ("DUII'), although the nurse never
received any specialized training or education related to traumatic brain
injuries, and had cared for or supervised the care of approximately 20
patients with a traumatic brain injury over ten years of working as a
30 1
a DUII case, an officer
nurse.3 0 0 On the other hand, in State v. Brown,
how a person with
about
testimony
provide
to
expert
an
as
qualify
did not
on a horizontal
perform
will
injury
brain
traumatic
a
nystagmus from
gaze nystagmus ("HGN") test because:

"

He "had no experience administering the HGN test to or
otherwise evaluating people with traumatic brain injuries[;]"

"

He "lacked any observational knowledge of whether people
with traumatic brain injuries generally exhibit nystagmus
and, if they do, whether they exhibit only some of the six
'clues' on the HGN test[;]" and
"[H]e lacked knowledge of the physiology of nystagmus and
lacked expertise in traumatic brain injuries or their
302
symptoms."

"

In short, it is impossible to understand how the legal system deals
with criminal defendants with TBI without a fully-textured consideration
of questions related to access to qualified experts, in addition to the
303
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298. Perlin & Lynch, supra note 58, at 312.
299. 408 P.3d 267, 270 (Or. App. 2017).
300. Id. at 271.
301. 430 P.3d 160, 167-69 (Or. App. 2018).
302. State v. Brown, 430 P.3d 160, 162, 167-69 (Or. Ct. App. 2018); see also OR. R. EVID.
702; supratext accompanying notes 122-132 (discussing the Lisa Montgomery case and the
failure to effectively submit evidence of Lisa's PET and MRI results due to the unsupported
testimony of Dr. Gur).
303. See supra Section III.
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V. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE

A.

Introduction30 4

Therapeutic jurisprudence recognizes that, "as a therapeutic agent,"
the law can have "therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences .... "305
It asks whether legal "rules, procedures, and [lawyers'] roles can or
should be reshaped . . . to enhance their therapeutic potential, while not
subordinating due process principles."306 Professor David Wexler clearly
identifies how the tension inherent in this inquiry must be resolved: the
law's "use [of] mental health information to improve therapeutic
functioning [cannot] imping[e] upon justice concerns."3 0 7 As one of the coauthors (MLP) has written elsewhere, "an inquiry into therapeutic
outcomes does not mean that therapeutic concerns 'trump' civil rights
and civil liberties." 308 Therapeutic jurisprudence "look[s] at law as it
actually impacts people's lives," 309 and TJ supports "an ethic of care."310
It attempts to bring about healing and wellness, 31 1 and to value

psychological health. 312

&

304. This section is largely adapted from Michael L. Perlin, 'Tve Got My Mind Made Up":
How Judicial Teleology in Cases Involving Biologically Based Evidence Violates
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 24 CARDOZO J. EQUAL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 81, 93-95 (2017)
[hereinafter Perlin, Mind Made Up]; see also Perlin & Lynch, supra note 58, at 353 n.169.
Further, it distills Perlin's work over the past 28 years, beginning with Michael L. Perlin,
What Is Therapeutic Jurisprudence?, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 623, 623 (1993). See
generally Michael L. Perlin, "Have You Seen Dignity?"- The Story of the Development of
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 27 N.Z. UNIVS. L. REV. 1135 (2017); Michael L. Perlin,
"Changing of the Guards": David Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, and the
Transformationof Legal Scholarship, 63 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 3 (2019).
305. Michael L. Perlin, "HisBrain Has Been Mismanaged with Great Skill": How Will
JurorsRespond to Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?, 42 AKRON L. REV.
885, 912 (2009).
306. Michael L. Perlin, "And My Best Friend, My Doctor/Won't Even Say What It Is I've
Got": The Role and Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 42 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 735, 751 (2005).
307. David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudenceand Changing Conceptions of Legal
Scholarship, 11 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 17, 21 (1993).
308. Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 412 (2000).
309. Bruce J. Winick, Foreword:TherapeuticJurisprudencePerspectiveson Dealingwith
Victims of Crime, 33 NOVA L. REV. 535, 535 (2009).
310. Perlin, Mind Made Up, supra note 304, at 94 (quoting in part Bruce J. Winick
David B. Wexler, The Use of TherapeuticJurisprudencein Law School Clinical Education:
Transforming the CriminalLaw Clinic, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 605, 605-07 (2006)).
311. Id. (citing Bruce J. Winick, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Model for Civil
Commitment, in INVOLUNTARY
DETENTION AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE:
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON CIVIL COMMITMENT 23, 26 (Kate Diesfeld & Ian

Freckelton eds., 2003)).
312. Id.
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TJ and TBI

Consider specifically the relationship between the TBI-criminal
procedure connection and TJ. Look first at questions of confessions.
There is some significant literature about the relationship between
criminal confessions and therapeutic jurisprudence. Professor David
Wexler has emphasized that the fact of a confession does not end the
313
inquiry into the application of TJ principles in a criminal case.
Professor Amy Ronner, by way of example, argues that "[t]herapeutic
jurisprudence can also give us a new perspective on client confession and
help dispel what [Professor Robert] Cochran has denominated the
'authoritarian model,' which impugns 'client dignity' and suffocates
'moral growth."' 314 But the impact of TBI specifically on the questions at
hand has yet to be considered.
On incompetency to stand trial, two of the authors (MLP & AJL) have
previously explored the therapeutic jurisprudence implications of this
stage of the case, and have suggested a series of dialogues that a TJfocused lawyer might have with her client to discuss the issues raised by
5
a decision that seeks to invoke the TJ status.1 Other scholars have
similarly explored the connection between lawyers embracing
316
Yet, until now, there has
therapeutic jurisprudence and this status.
not been-to the best of our knowledge-any consideration of how a TJembracing lawyer might approach a criminal incompetency proceeding
with a client with a traumatic brain injury.
On the question of insanity, one of the authors has written frequently
about the potential ameliorative implications of TJ on all aspects of
317
and has specifically recommended that we
insanity defense policy,

313. See David B. Wexler, Lowering the Volume Through Legal Doctrine: A Promising
Pathfor Therapeutic JurisprudenceScholarship,3 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 123, 128-30 (2002).
314. Amy D. Ronner, Dostoyevsky and the Therapeutic Jurisprudence Confession, 40 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 41, 111 (2006) (quoting in part Robert F. Cochran, Crime, Confession,
and the Counselor-at-Law:Lessons from Dostoyevsky, 35 HOUSTON L. REV. 327, 380 (1998)).
315. See, e.g., Perlin & Lynch, supra note 3, at 318-20 (discussing Michael L. Perlin,
"Too Stubborn To Ever Be Governed by Enforced Insanity": Some Therapeutic
JurisprudenceDilemmas in the Representation of Criminal Defendants in Incompetency
and Insanity Cases, 33 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 475, 477-78 (2010)).
316. See, e.g., Keri A. Gould, Therapeutic Jurisprudenceand the Arraignment Process;
The Defense Attorney's Dilemma: Whether to Request a Competency Evaluation?, in MENTAL
HEALTH LAW AND PRACTICE THROUGH THE LIFE CYCLE 67 (S. Verdun-Jones & M. Layton

eds., 1994); David B. Wexler, TherapeuticJurisprudenceand the Criminal Courts, 35 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 279, 279-80 (1993).
317. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin et al., "On DesolationRow": The Blurringof the Borders
Between Civil and CriminalMental Disability Law, and What It Means to All of Us, 24 TEX.
J. CIv. LIBERTIES & CIV. RTS. 59, 109-11 (2018); Michael L. Perlin, "God Said to
Abraham/Kill Me a Son": Why the Insanity Defense and the Incompetency Status Are
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"rigorously apply therapeutic jurisprudence principles to each aspect of
the insanity defense." 31 8 The debacle of Lisa Montgomery's proffered
insanity defense should be as clear evidence of this need as one can
imagine.
The relationship between TJ and the intersection between TBI and
mitigation should be clear. We know that sentencing and mitigation
trainings offered nationwide by the National Association of Sentencing
Advocates are grounded in the core principles of therapeutic
jurisprudence. 31 9 Professor Kristine Huskie has looked carefully at the
relationship between TBI and the practices of Veteran Courts, 320 one of
the types of problem-solving courts premised, in large part, on
therapeutic jurisprudence values. 32 1 David Wexler, one of the founders of
TJ, discusses the importance of gathering information about mitigation
and rehabilitative options in criminal defense practice.322 Although not
specifically denominated as a "TJ piece," Rebecca Covarrubias's

admonition to defense counsel in death penalty cases-to "gather as
much information as possible about the defendant's history including
police reports, medical records, birth records, pediatric records and
hospital records" 32 3-sets out a TJ blueprint for the representation of
defendants with TBI.
In the aggregate, the recognition of a physical component of the
illness of the cohort of defendants whom we are writing about here could
help to comport with the TJ principles of dignity, voice, and validation.
What we face is especially troubling for these individuals, since, again,
Compatible with and Required by the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
and Basic Principles of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 477, 512-13
(2017); Perlin, supra note 306, at 913-14.
318. PERLIN, supra note 97, at 443.
319. Cait Clarke & James Neuhard, Making the Case: TherapeuticJurisprudence and
Problem-Solving Practices Positively Impact Clients, Justice Systems and Communities
They Serve, 17 SAINT THOMAS L. REV. 781, 788-89 (2005).
320. See, e.g., Kristine A. Huskey, Reconceptualizing "the Crime"in Veterans Treatment
Courts, 27 FED. SENT'O REP. 178 (2015); Kristine A. Huskey, Justice for Veterans: Does
Theory Matter?, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 697 (2017).
321. Julie Marie Baldwin, Investigating the ProgrammaticAttack: A National Survey of
Veterans Treatment Courts, 105 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 705, 713 (2015) (citing Michael
L. Perlin, "JohnBrown Went Off to War": ConsideringVeterans Courts as Problem-Solving
Courts, 37 NOVA L. REV. 445 (2013)).
322.

REHABILITATING

LAWYERS: PRINCIPLES OF THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE FOR

CRIMINAL LAW PRACTICE (David B. Wexler ed., 2008), as discussed in Beth Caldwell,
Appealing to Empathy: Counsel's Obligation to PresentMitigatingEvidence for Juveniles in
Adult Court, 64 ME. L. REV. 391, 392 n.4 (2012).
323. Rebecca J. Covarrubias, Lives in Defense Counsel's Hands: The Problems and
Responsibilitiesof Defense Counsel RepresentingMentally Ill or Mentally Retarded Capital
Defendants, 11 SCHOLAR 413, 467 (2009), as discussed in PERLIN, supra note 223, at 13637.
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"the recognition of a physical component of their disability could help to
comport with [these] therapeutic jurisprudence principles of dignity,
324
The ability to adequately present evidence to
voice and validation."
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avenue through which to present legitimate evidence should be granted
in the appropriate cases. If used correctly, neuroimaging evidence could
serve as a valuable tool for implementing therapeutic jurisprudence
327
principles in these cases.
It is important to consider how therapeutic jurisprudence can be used
as a tool to remediate judicial stereotyping of defendants with traumatic
brain injury. In a series of articles, Professor Colleen Berryessa has
shown the impact of such stereotyping in cases involving defendants with
330
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324. Perlin & Lynch, supra note 58, at 354.
325. See id. at 354 n.173; e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.0026(2)(d) (West 2012) (treating a
situation in which "[t]he defendant requires specialized treatment for a mental disorder
that is unrelated to substance abuse or addiction or for a physical disability, and the
defendant is amenable to treatment" as a mitigating circumstance).
326. Perlin & Lynch, supra note 58, at 355. For information on stigma and sanism, see
also, e.g., Michael L. Perlin & Keri K. Gould, Rashomon and the Criminal Law: Mental
Disabilityand the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 431 (1995); Michael L.
Perlin, The Sanist Lives of Jurors in Death Penalty Cases: The Puzzling Role of "Mitigating"
Mental Disability Evidence, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 239, 241 (1994).
327. Perlin & Lynch, supra note 58, at 355.
328. See Colleen M. Berryessa, Judicial Stereotyping Associated with Genetic
EssentialistBiases Toward Mental Disordersand Potential Negative Effects on Sentencing,
53 L. & Soc'Y REV. 202 (2019) [hereinafter Berryessa, Judicial Stereotyping]; Colleen M.
Berryessa, Judges' Views on Evidence of Genetic Contributions to Mental Disorders in
Court, 27 J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY & PSYCH. 586 (2016).

329. See Colleen M. Berryessa, Extralegal Punishment Factors and Judges' Normative
Judgments of Moral Responsibility of by FTD Patients, 7 AJOB NEUROsCI. 216 (2016).
330. Colleen M. Berryessa, Judiciary Views on Criminal Behaviour and Intention of
Offenders with High-FunctioningAutism, 5 J. INTELL. DISABILITIES & OFFENDING BEHAV.

97 (2014) [hereinafter Berryessa, Judiciary Views]; Colleen M. Berryessa, Judicial
Perceptions of Media Portrayalsof Offenders with High Functioning Autistic Spectrum
Disorders, 3 INT'L J. CRIMINOLOGY & SoCIO. 46 (2014).
331. See supra text accompanying notes 252-53.
332. Berryessa, Judiciary Views, supranote 330, at 103 (stating that judges interviewed
believed that the behavior of persons with autism was not under their control).
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cognitive awareness related to . . . biases and how such biases in cases
involving mental disorders may result in anti-therapeutic outcomes by
hindering an offender's potential treatment opportunities." 333
It is also essential to consider the relationship between therapeutic

jurisprudence and the quality of counsel in death penalty cases, an issue
that is magnified significantly in cases involving defendants with TBI,
where, as we have sought to make clear, counsel is near-globally
ineffective. As one of the co-authors (MLP) said many years ago, "any
death penalty system that provides inadequate counsel and that, at least
as a partial result of that inadequacy, fails to insure [sic] that mental
disability evidence is adequately considered and contextualized by death
penalty
decision-makers,
fails
miserably
from a therapeutic
jurisprudence perspective." 3 34 The examples we discuss here-not just
the case of Lisa Montgomery but others as well-make crystal-clear how
our system has utterly failed from a TJ perspective.
There has been virtually no scholarship to this point on the precise
issue of TJ and defendants with TBI, save one piece by Professor Evan
Seamone, applying the principles of TJ to the punishment of active-duty
military offenders with PTSD and TBI who exist in a disciplinary
structure that is distinct from the civilian justice system and serves very
different ends. 335 We hope that this piece spurs other academics and
practitioners to think about the integration of these issues.
CONCLUSION

Persons with TBI in the criminal justice system are at a serious
disadvantage and are significantly at risk of being denied necessary
constitutional and human rights. A lack of understanding on many
fronts-including the basics of TBI, how it differs from the

more-typically-seen mental illness, how it should be assessed, presented
and effectively argued before a jury, and how clients with TBI can be
assisted by TJ principles-contributes to poor outcomes for individuals
with TBI facing serious charges. Lisa Montgomery's case is, sadly, not an

exception. 336
333. Berryessa, Judicial Stereotyping, supranote 328, at 209.
334. Michael L. Perlin, 'The Executioner's Face Is Always Well-Hidden" The Role of
Counsel and the Courts in Determining Who Dies, 41 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 201, 235 (1996);
see also Perlin et al., supra note 225, at 305-07.
335. Evan R. Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice: The
Suspended Punitive Dischargeas a Method to Treat Military Offenders with PTSD and TBI
and Reduce Recidivism, 208 MIL. L. REV. 1, 29 (2011) (discussing TJ in the context of
veterans' treatment courts).

336.

Id.
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As we have sought to demonstrate, few judges or defense counsel
have any sense of what TBI means and its potential impact on the
defendant's actions. The case law-whether on pre-trial questions,
matters of competency or insanity, or the death penalty-starkly
demonstrates the failure of all relevant parties to "get" the meaning and
impact of TBI on the defendant's subsequent criminal behavior.
As we have indicated, courts are rarely responsive to Strickland v.
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did) go wrong in a death penalty case involving a defendant with TBI.339
We believe that if the principles of TJ were to be embraced, we would
take a major step toward rectifying the imbalances inherent in the
current system. We agree with Professor Amy Ronner and Judge Juan
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here-similarly fail "miserably."

337. See supra notes 255-66 accompanying text.
338. For more on the role of the expert as an educator, see Michael L. Perlin, "Justice's
Beautiful Face": Bob Sadoff and the Redemptive Promise of Therapeutic Jurisprudence,40
J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 265, 274 (2012) (discussing the late Dr. Robert L. Sadoff).
339. See generally United States v. Montgomery, 635 F.3d 1074 (8th Cir. 2011).
340. Juan Ramirez, Jr. & Amy D. Ronner, Voiceless Billy Budd: Melville's Tribute to the
Sixth Amendment, 41 CAL. W.L. REV. 103, 119 (2004), as quoted in Perlin, Merchants, supra
note 160, at 1542.
341. See, e.g., Perlin, supra note 82, at 78-80; see also Lisa Montgomery, supra note 6.
342. Perlin, supra note 323, at 235.
343. See Lisa Montgomery, supra note 6.
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The song from which the first part of our title is drawn is a song about
"dwelling in the pain,"34 4 and perhaps, a song "about death[.]" 345 An
analysis of the lyric in question phrases it this way:
Darkness, misery and pain is all around him and no matter how
hard he tortures his mind, he is unable to understand or to come
to terms with all this misery and hardships he encounters in this
world. He has no alternative but to walk that lonesome valley,
the dark pathways of life which are so puzzling and uncertain. 346
Those about whom we write-persons with traumatic brain injury
enmeshed in the criminal trial process-often, in Attwood's phrase,
"[can't] sort it . .. out[,]" and continue to "dwellfl in . .. pain[.]" 347 By way
of stark example, Lisa Montgomery was never able to "come to terms with
all this misery and hardships" she faced in the world. 3 48 As we noted
above, a lawyer representing a defendant with TBI must exhibit-per
Professor Richard Thomas's commentary on the song from which our title
lyric is drawn-a "deep sense of humanity .... "349 We hope that, if our
recommendations here are taken seriously, lawyers (and courts) will
exhibit this "deep sense of humanity[,]" 3 5 O and the pain that those with
TBI suffer (like Montgomery) may, to some extent, be alleviated.

344. Robert D. Stolorow, I'll Be With You When the Deal Goes Down, PSYCH. TODAY (Mar.
3, 2013), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/feeling-relating-existing/201303/i-ll-beyou-when-the-deal-goes-down.
345. Tony Attwood, When the Deal Goes Down by Bob Dylan. A Religious Tract or
Rumination
on
Death?,
UNTOLD
DYLAN
(July
24,
2017),
https://bobdylan.org.uk/archives/5016 ("And thus we toil, we work, we try to sort it all out, but in the
end we can't....").

346. Kees de Graaf, Bob Dylan's 'When the Deal Goes Down' -Lyric Analysis,
https://www.keesdegraaf.com/media/Mis/2325pl66o4clg3lo8mlicvub7fi6eskl.pdf
(last
visited Dec. 4, 2021).
347. Attwood, supra note 345.
348. de Graaf, supranote 346; see Lisa Montgomery, supra note 6.
349. THOMAS, supra note 18, at 230.
350. Id.

